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Russian Spirituality and the Theology of Negation1
Mikhail Epstein
Toward the end of the twentieth century Russian culture found itself at a
crossroads which cannot be ascribed to any political election but which
rather presupposed a radical change in its religious and social orientation.
Two somewhat opposing theses will be developed in this article. First I will
discuss the processes of secularization in Russian culture and the
necessity of a third, neutral zone between the "sacred" and the "profane."
Next, the dangers of social neutralization in culture and the necessity of
retaining elements of the dual model along with the introduction of
intermediate elements will be presented. We will hope that these theses
are but partly contradictory; that is, when combined they will not cancel
each other out, but will rather produce a "ternary" model of a cultural
symbiosis between the extreme and the median, despite their apparent
incongruity.
The Failure of the First Secularization. The Church of Gogol and the
Church of Belinsky
The interrelation of religion and culture in Russia was defined by the
historical difficulties of secularization in regions dominated by Eastern
Christianity. As we know, Russia did not experience a Renaissance and
Reformation, and only entered the flow of European secularization at a
relatively late stage, at the time of the Enlightenment. Thus the organic
link between Christianity and humanism, Christianity and individualism,
the divine and the earthly, which was imprinted upon European culture
during the Renaissance and the Reformation, remained foreign to Russian
culture, in which these two poles emerged only in their growing isolation.
In the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries Russian
culture, coursing down the pan-European channel, passed swiftly through
its stage of Enlightenment secularism — from Lomonosov to Pushkin.
Essentially, Pushkin was the last representative of Russian secular
literature in its uninterrupted century-long evolution from the time of
Peter the Great's reforms.
The secularization of Russian culture was cut short with Gogol and
Belinsky — in an ironic historical twist, almost concurrently with its
acceleration in Europe, spurred by the revolutions of 1848. Specifically,
the "Selections from Correspondence with Friends" (1847) and Belinsky's

letter to Gogol, written at the same time, initiated the epoch of "neomedievalism" in Russia, which was predicted, as we know, by Berdiaev in
his 1924 work, "Neo-Medievalism." The prediction proved all the more
true by virtue of its being made essentially in hindsight, in the middle
rather than the beginning of this epoch. According to Berdiaev, the world
entered "neo-medievalism" in the twentieth century, when modern values
— humanism, individualism, secularization — had been exhausted, "when
the movement away from God ends and the movement toward God
begins," when "God must once more become the center of our whole
lives," and "knowledge, morality, art, government, the economy — all
must become religious, but freely and from within, not coerced from
without."2 The second volume of Dead Souls, burned "freely and from
within" by its author, became the first bonfire of this neo-medieval
inquisition.
In my view, Russian neo-medievalism lasted 140 years and can be divided
equally into two 70-year periods: the pre-Revolutionary and the postRevolutionary. The first period, from 1847 to 1917, from Gogol's selfimmolation to the "world fire in blood" (Blok), is characterized by the
struggle between the church of Gogol and the church of Belinsky. Gogol
ushered in neo-medievalism because his faith had ceased to be dogmatic,
mixed in with the lukewarm traditional beliefs of the secular age; fire
erupted from this faith once more, that fire which consumed Gogol's
creative work. This modernist medievalism was the medievalism of a new
age, when faith no longer lorded over society's consciousness, but instead
reasserted itself in the individual consciousness, in contrast to the tepid,
secular condition of the world at large.3 In this sense, Gogol is not only
the first neo-medieval writer, but also the first Russian modernist.
Modernism marks the end of the new era, when its secular reserves, its
rationalism, humanism, and liberalism are exhausted, when new religious
strivings and avant-garde projects to save the world crop up in the social
arena, when the flow of time is reversed and the Middle Ages wind up in
our future.
At the same time secularism can be rejected in two ways, as evidenced by
Gogol and Belinsky, who bifurcated the paths of Russian new-religious
culture. In Gogol secularism gives way to religiosity, while Belinsky
elevates secularism to the level of strident dogma. Yet it is important to
underscore that both types of religiosity have much in common; both are
post-secular and thus under the same unbelievable, inhuman pressure
involved in the suppression or crowding-out of the secular. According to
Gogol anything done in Russia should be done as though the heavenly
kingdom were already at hand: "All of us should now serve not as in the

old Russia , but as we would in the heavenly kingdom under Christ
himself. . . . We must remember only that our duties were undertaken for
Christ's sake, and thus should be carried out according to his will, and
none other."4 This means that whether one is a petty copy-clerk or a
great Russian writer, his direct supervisor is Christ. Here already is that
very "church of the third testament" which Merezhkovsky and Berdiaev
tried to establish in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century,
blessed in Gogol's name. Merezhkovsky concludes his study "Gogol and
the Devil" with the words "'Be ye not dead, O living souls!' — this is
Gogol's final testament to all of us, not just Russian society but the
Russian church as well. What should we do to fulfill this testament?."5
Gogol's super-religiosity and Belinsky's quasi-religiosity constitute a dual
modification of the medieval religious spirit, because the new and old
Middle Ages are already separated by the Enlightenment, that secular
period which was now being displaced — hence the intensity of this new
conversion, the willingness to bow down and to burn what was once
precious. Neither the believer Zhukovsky nor the non-believer (at least in
his earlier years) Pushkin ever displayed such an intense relationship to
religion; both belong to the secular age, when faith and the lack of it
coexisted peacefully as private convictions, not interfering with friendly
and even ideological alliances. A difference in faith did not even preclude
like-mindedness, did not prevent Zhukovsky and Pushkin from being close
in the creative and socio-cultural spheres; but one cannot imagine a
friendship, not to mention a union of ideas, between Gogol and Belinsky in
their later years. Both are heretics, each subject to excommunication from
that church which the other serves so ardently. Post-secularism gives rise
to remarkable, even grotesque fusions which could not exist in an
exclusively religious culture or in a secular one — specifically, avant-garde
fundamentalism (Gogol) and religious atheism (Belinsky). In that same
letter to Gogol, Belinsky proclaims that "someone like Voltaire, who used
his wit to quell the fires of fanaticism and ignorance in Europe, is
obviously more a flesh-and-blood son of Christ than all of your popes,
archbishops, metropolitans, and patriarchs!."6 Such 'inside-out' logic and
biblical turns of phrase retained their persuasive power even seventy
years later — for Bely in his poem "Christ is Risen" (1918) and for Blok in
his poem "12" (1918). If Voltaire is the son of Christ, then why should
Marx not be his beloved offspring as well? Why are the twelve red guards
not his apostles? In his unsent reply to Belinsky, Gogol calculates this
historical curve far into the future and anticipates the dogmatics of his
heirs: "Who then, in your opinion, can best and most accurately interpret
Christ these days? Can it really be these communists and socialists who
claim that Christ bid them to steal property and rob those who had

amassed some wealth? Come to your senses!"7
Of course no one came to his senses, and Belinsky was elevated to the
leadership of Russia 's non-believing intelligentsia. In the Silver age, when
the battle between the two post-secular churches intensifies, the necessity
arises for both to canonize their saints and provide a theological
foundation for their respective teachings. As Ivanov-Razumnik wrote,
death deprived Belinsky of "that crown of thorns which would have made
his already great name holy. But even lacking that we see this name
encircled by the glowing halo of a fighter and a martyr. . . . Belinsky was
the banner of the Russian intelligentsia, and inscribed on that banner were
the words: 'Under this Sign Be Victorious.'"8 If the churches of Gogol and
Belinksy were by turns victorious in the pre-revolutionary period, then in
the period following the revolution — also lasting seventy years —
Belinsky's church triumphed and displaced Gogol's. Religious secularism —
that is, pious atheism — has routed post-secular fundamentalism. Russian
neo-medievalism ended seventy years after the revolution, in the very
same year (1988) in which Belinsky's church not only celebrated the
millennial anniversary of Christianity in Russia with much official fanfare,
but also issued an edict which allowed, and even demanded the republication of works by Russian religious thinkers for the first time in
seventy years. Belinsky's heirs weakly extended a hand to the almost
completely exterminated heirs of Gogol. Thus the second secularization of
Russian culture was set in motion ten years ago.
To sustain itself, secularity must remain neutral toward religion; otherwise
secularization itself takes on an anti-religious (hence religious and antisecular) character. Secularity plays on its fine distinctions from religiosity,
and these should never cross over to become their own opposites. There
is nothing improbable about this; if the religious community in modernday Europe is gradually becoming secularized — and is doing so
immanently, without pressure from some foreign civilization—then it
follows that there is room for secularity even in the most Christian of
religions. Even the Gospels stipulate a place for the secular in human life;
for example, in the parable about talent, or the one about the kingdom of
Caesar and the kingdom of God. The very image of God becoming man
carries great secular potential. In Europe, secularization presents itself as
a means to strengthen religious freedom and human liberty. Religion itself
has begun to provide for a certain freedom from the predominant religion,
for the possibility of divergence between personal faith and the national
creed, for the freedom to believe or not.
Thus, secularization did not appear out of nowhere, as some primordial

and proper state of mankind, but is rather the product of lengthy religious
evolution, and is possible only in the context of certain religions (hence
the difficulty of sustaining a secular society in Muslim countries). As Paul
Tillich remarks, "the sacred is also open to secularization."9That
secularization which undermines its religious foundation turns against
religion and consequently against itself, becoming the worst variety of
quasi-religion. And if secularization did indeed arise from religion, then it
requires religious justification to the same degree to which religion needs
secular society to acknowledge it as an independent, otherworldly sphere
of being.
The above applies equally to Western art, which, as a secular
phenomenon, grew out from Christianity when the ancient monotheistic
prohibition on the visual representation of man was revoked by God's own
appearance as a man on earth. The imagery in worldly art, as it arose
during the Renaissance and remains to our day, is rooted in a specifically
Christian imagery, which cannot be reduced to symbols, conventional
signifiers of the infinite, or abstract vegetative ornaments, but which
rather brings the entire sensory world into the realm of the depictable. Art
itself is another version of faith, just as expediency cannot be understood
without a sense of its greater goal, presupposed by a believer's reason. In
the writings of Kant, who did the most to distinguish among the three
functions of human reason (the theoretical, the practical, and the
aesthetic) we can find an explanation for this bond between art and
religion: the aesthetic function of discernment and the religious function of
reason are connected in the sense that both seek "expediency" and "the
ultimate purpose." Art presupposes an intensity of experience and the
representation of each phenomenon precisely at the moment when it itself
becomes a form of expediency — that is, it is no longer connected to the
idea of an outside purpose. "Beauty is a form of an object's expediency,
because it is perceivedwithout any consideration of its purpose."10 In the
contemplation of beauty the idea of God is not perceived as the ultimate
purpose precisely because we have already formed our perception of the
world and contemplate it immanently, as a purpose unto itself. The
religious and the artistic converge in Christianity even more definitively
than they did in the pagan days of antiquity, when the progressive
tendency strove toward the suppression and ascetic rejection of the flesh,
toward a religion of pure ideas, the unseen Whole, toward the eradication
of art. After this eclipse in the Platonic and neo-Platonic perception of the
world — or rather, rejection of the world — art was saved by Christianity.
This is why Plato expels the poets from the ideal city-state, while Thomas
Aquinas welcomes them back under the aegis of holy learning. "Poetry
makes use of metaphors to produce a representation, for it is natural to

man to be pleased with representations… The ray of divine revelation is
not extinguished by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled. . . ."11
In Russia, even in the twentieth century and even in the most cultured
circles, Renaissance art was still seen as spiritually alien, frightening, too
physical and sensual. There is a startling note written by Alexander Blok a
year after he traveled to Italy and worshipped at all the artistic shrines of
the Renaissance. "In the Middle Ages the Church forbade the making of
images. I was born in the Middle Ages. Thus, for me, the Renaissance is
crimson, terrifying."12 12 Blok was a man of the neo-medieval period. Is
this not why he hastened to bury the epoch of humanism at the first
opportunity, in his lecture called "The Collapse of Humanism" (1919),
though in Russia this epoch had not even begun?
The Search for "Purgatory" in Russian Culture
While the Bolshevik Revolution represented the collapse of European
humanism for Blok, a score of other thinkers explained it rather as the
result of the unripeness and inadequacy of Russian humanism, whose
fruits rotted too early because they had no time to ripen (to use Diderot's
famous expression regarding the fruits of the Enlightenment in eighteenth
century Russia). The philosopher Sergei Askoldov, ruminating about the
causes of the Russian revolution in the compilation From the
Depths (1918), describes the third starting point which never took root in
the Russian soul as a simple human one. "In the makeup of any soul there
is a fundamental essence which is holy, another which is specifically
human and one that is animal. Perhaps the greatest peculiarity of the
Russian soul lies in the fact that the middle, specifically human essence
appears disproportionately weak compared with the national psychologies
of other peoples. As a type, the Russian displays the predominance of the
holy and the animal essences. . . . Culture and humanism never took root
as positive energies in Russia, but were disseminated and strengthened in
the form of negative ones, seen as theomachistic or, at the very least,
antireligious."13
In other words, Russian culture sorely needs some sort of middle ground,
between the ideal of Sodom and the ideal of the Madonna. In direct
contact, these two poles ensure extreme tension in this culture and a
simultaneous imbalance which results in man (along with everything
human in Russia, including culture) hurtling "headlong" into the abyss.
The poles are easily reversed because there is no intermediate zone
between them. "The Russian people are polarized to the highest degree;

they embody the intersection of opposites" writes Berdiaev.14
Structural/historical studies of Russian culture confirm this
religious/philosophical intuition. According to the well-known definition put
forth by Yuri Lotman and Boris Ouspensky, "the specific trajectory of
Russian culture… is its principal polarity, expressed in its dualistic
structure. In the system of Russian medievalism the fundamental cultural
values (ideological, political, religious) lie in a bipolar field of values,
bisected by a sharp line and lacking any neutral axial zone."15 Thus, the
afterworld in Russian medievalism is divided into hell and heaven, while
Catholic conceptions allow a third to exist between these two —
purgatory, a place for the souls of people who were not quite saints and
not quite sinners, but who lived in an average, human sort of way and
who, after enduring the trials of purification, might earn salvation. "Thus it
became possible, in the real life of the Western Middle Ages, to have a
wide field of neutral behavior and neutral social institutions which were
neither 'sacred' nor 'sinful,' neither loyal to the state nor destructive of it,
neither bad nor good."16
Of course, every culture needs a middle way — a specifically secular way
— to prevent it from flailing from one extreme to the other, from piety to
godlessness, from asceticism to debauchery. Strictly speaking, this is what
happened in Russian culture, where a dualistic model prevailed over the
course of many centuries; the high and the low changed places while the
middle ground, the "purgatory," lay fallow. Yuri Lotman, who researched
these binary structures in Russian culture, concluded his last
book, Cultural Explosion (1992), with the hope that Russia,
afterperestroika and the reforms, might finally overcome "the harsh
dictates of its historically binary structure" and "switch to the panEuropean ternary system."17 Dichotomy breeds a tendency toward
revolution, toward a culture that evolves by virtue of explosions, with
opposites rapidly changing places; it precludes gradual development,
which can take place only in a neutral zone of judgment. "The progression
from thinking oriented toward explosive bursts of change to an
evolutionary consciousness," Lotman writes, "now takes on a special
significance, since all the familiar cultures of the past gravitated toward
polarity and maximalism."18
Such a strategic change demands that we reexamine the foundations of
Russian culture and its initial philosophical reference points, as Sergei
Averintsev did recently in an article on Christian Aristoteleanism. Two
thinkers stand at the source of Western civilization: Plato, with his
dualistic split between the material and the ideal realms, and Aristotle,

who tried to mediate between these extremes by arguing that ideas were
present in objects themselves, as their inherent forms. Russian civilization
chose the Platonic model and developed it with a relentless consistency
which led directly to the realization of Plato's ideal government, where the
order of things was strictly subservient to the order of ideas and where, as
historical experience points up, the state is destroyed by its very
materialism. Averintsev poses the question: In spite of the obvious
Platonic leanings in Russian thought (as evidenced by everyone from
Kireievsky to Losev), is it impossible, even at so late a date compared
with the West, to orient this thought toward Aristotle, who is more
sensible and tolerant of the human condition? "If Plato is the first utopian
thinker, then Aristotle is the first thinker to look the utopian spirit straight
in the eye and overcome it. . . . The Aristotelean method is far more
neutral toward religion than Platonic ecstasy. . . . Aristotle's rule of right
measure reigns in the natural world, where the good man finds the middle
way between two fallacious extremes."19
Rather than the Platonic/Augustinian line of thought, which had such a
deep effect on Russia's sense of the infinite, Averintsev invites Orthodoxy
to approach the line of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, which accepts the
middle way, which presents a keen religious explanation of the natural
world instead of jumping to condemn and reshape it, as though it were
based in evil. Orthodoxy should follow the lead of Catholic philosophy and
acknowledge "the realm of nature" which lies between "the heavenly
realm of the supernatural and the infernal realm of the unnatural"20 and
which has its own juridical and moral law based on the social contract and
regulating human relations in the gap between "do unto others" and "dog
eat dog."
Thus, the middle way benefits not only from a liberal/pragmatic
justification, but also from an earlier theological, and later structuralist
foundation. Now at the end of the twentieth century, it would be madness
to deny the necessity of this third, judgmentally neutral, centralizing,
equalizing element in Russian culture.
Mediocrity. The Western Model
I believe I have adequately explained the need for a neutral space
between the poles, and here I have relied on a well-formulated Westernist
tradition in Russian thought. As I proceed, however, I will draw on another
tradition — on critics of the West, who are nonetheless not Slavophile
critics. A purely Slavophile critique condemns the West precisely for its
dualism, the divergence between heart and mind, between the juridical

and the moral, subject and object, etc., preaching instead the unification
of all of these far-flung extremes in a higher synthesis — hence
Kireievsky's "integrated knowledge" and Soloviev's universalist theology.
In addition, Slavophiles use a particularly Western baggage of ideas, from
the Hegelian dialectic and categories of synthesis to Shelling's philosophy
of identity, etc.
But there is another critique of the West which underscores not the split,
but rather the depressing uniformity of the Western middle class. Long
before postmodernism erased the difference between elite and mass
culture, this same tendency toward a middle ground, assimilation,
homogeneity, could be found in ninetheenth century Western society and
elicited practically an apoplectic horror as the specter of a new "Sinoism."
The struggle against the rule of the all-encompassing Average brought
together the liberal Mill and the anti-liberal Nietzsche, the revolutionary
socialist Herzen and the reactionary monarchist Leontiev, as well as the
apocalyptic revolutionary, anti-monarchist, and anti- socialist
Merezhkovsky.
According to John Stuart Mill's observation, Europe, which was "wholly
indebted to this plurality of paths for its progressive and many-sided
development," began by the middle of the nineteenth century to
"advanc(e) towards the Chinese ideal of making all people
alike."21 Herzen agrees with him: "Nearby, around the corner,
everywhere lurks the thousand-headed hydra…the autocratic crowd of
Mill's 'conglomerated mediocrity'. . . Yes, my friend, it's time to
acknowledge and accept that bourgeoisie is the ultimate form of Western
civilization, its coming-of-age, its état adulte; it concludes the long line of
dreams, the epic of growth, the romance of youth — everything that gave
so much poetry and trouble to the lives of nations."22 Despite all apparent
differences in ideals, Leontiev agrees with both: "All grace and depth,
everything remarkable in any way, all naiveté, everything refined,
primordial or capriciously developed, everything brilliant and everything
wild, all of it retreats in equal measure before the relentless onslaught of
these gray people. . . . I love mankind too much to wish this peaceful yet
petty and degrading future for it."23
And so the question arises: If the Platonic line of development leads
society toward an ideocracy, then does the Aristotelean line not lead to
mediocrity? As the realm of natural law expands, Western culture passes
more and more into a middle zone, avoiding edges and extremes, moving
in the "neither holy nor sinful" domain, neither exalted nor base. Western
cultural development in this latest, postmodern period leads precisely to

such an accelerated neutralization of opposites; perhaps its chief
characteristic is the replacement of opposites with differences. As I
proceed, I will not focus so much on Western culture per se -- it is too rich
and far-reaching for any such definition -- as on those poststructuralist theories which attempt to define the future of this culture in
terms of the value it assigns to neutrality and pluralism while
simultaneously renouncing all dualism and all oppositions. The theory and
practice of différance creates a new cultural space which can be called
heterogeneous, since it consists of differences -- in culture, in ethnicity, in
style, among individuals -- and at the same time can be called
homogeneous because it contains (as does language in Saussure's
definition) nothing but differences.
Such a culture does not permit judgment, for any judgment presupposes a
scale of values and hence gradations and poles, pluses and minuses. A
culture without values (which is un-judgeable), becomes a collection of
scattered facts, lacking the resilience of interrelatedness. The constant
references to "the alien" and "the other" in postmodern theory simply slip
down the chain of mutually referential signifiers in a single textual field. It
is a sort of semantic positivism based not on the perception of physically
observable facts (as in the nineteenth century) but on the interpretation of
signs. A methodological prohibition denies any access beyond the
boundaries of the sign-signifier system, and any realities appearing
beyond these boundaries -- that is, truly "other" -- are critically grouped
under the umbrella of the "transcendental signified." Thereby the category
of signification itself becomes essentially obsolete, since any sign
presupposes the relation of the signifier to the signified, that is, to
something radically "other." So instead of a "sign," with its inveterate
duality, deconstruction advances the concept of the "trail," which, despite
the etymological prototype and grammatical treatment embedded in its
meaning ("whose trail?") does not refer back to any original. In terms of
postmodern theory one cannot even call this sign-monism, because such
monism eliminates the very conception of a sign. This is medialism of the
most radical kind, one which not only cannot ascend to a triad but which
removes that tension, that frequently risky and predatory dialectic, that
lives on in the dualistic model. The terms "other" or "otherness" are
brought in to mean the "differences" among signs (or rather, trails) in
order to remove the far more radical difference between the sign and the
signified, between appearance and essence, superficiality and depth.
The result becomes a world devoid of the "other," consisting instead of
perfunctory differences thinly sprinkled with signs. It is the exact same
positivism denounced by Mill, Herzen, and Leontiev, only now it has

become a positivism of trails and imprints instead of the material
originals. Beneath the mask of all-encompassing différance all the
different occurrences are decidedly indifferent to one another. Gone are
the concepts of center and periphery, top and bottom, the spiritual and
the carnal, essence and appearance, beginning and end—all is crowded
out by the ubiquitous and endless middle. In his book/manifesto on
postmodern theology, Mark Taylor lays out this desired topography of the
"middle kingdom": "If die Mitte ist überall, die Mitte is not so much the
center as it is the milieu. Moreover, this milieu is not restricted to a
particular spatial or temporal point. It is everywhere and everytime. The
universality of the medium implies that what is intermediate is not
transitory and that what is interstitial is 'permanent.' Though always
betwixt 'n between, the 'eternal' time of the middle never begins nor
ends."24 One can, of course, understand the purported incentive behind
the theory of a boundless middle — the desire to find boundaries
everywhere, so that the game of crossing boundaries has neither
beginning nor end. But such an endless expanse of boundaries — "the
boundlessness of boundaries" in Mark Taylor's words — annuls the
restrictive nature of boundaries; that is, the very possibility of otherness
and transgression.
Along with a neutral space between opposite poles, culture sorely needs a
sharply drawn boundary between them. The fact that Russian culture is
growing in a "bipolar field of values, bisected by a sharp line" (Lotman,
Ouspensky),25 has its positive value. If this model is annulled in favor of
"changing to the pan-European ternary system" (Lotman), then the sharp
line will become a wide neutral space breeding legal, scientific, and
cultural institutions which are neutral in terms of the moral opposites
"good and evil," "mercy and cruelty," "virtue and sin," etc. But then
Lotman himself proves brilliantly, in his books The Structure of the Artistic
Text and Among Thinking Worlds that all events take place only along the
boundaries. Any narrative — that is, any progression of events, is
constructed as a series of intersections between semiotic boundaries:
between the center and the periphery, the living and the dead, "the rich
and the poor, the familiar and the alien, the orthodox and the heretics,
the enlightened and the ignorant, people of Nature and people of Society"
etc. "A textual event is the transportation of a character across the
boundary of a semantic field."26 The sharper the line, the more eventful is
its crossing, the more tightly wound the plot. The blurring of boundaries,
their transmutation into a wide neutral space, leads to eventlessness, the
annulment of plot, when social life begins to resemble a telephone book
rather than an adventure novel. In this sense, Western society, with its
cancellation of dichotomies and its sharp semantic boundaries diffused

into neutral zones, structures itself more and more along the lines of a
telephone book, where there is a place for every name, every address, but
where there is not and cannot be a captivating plot. The telephone book is
the structural prototype of that "matrix of differences" which was
superimposed over society by the theory of différance and
multiculturalism. Written in this telephone book of culture are the
addresses of all different cultures and the names of all its representatives,
from Shakespeare to Schoink, all in the same brevier. There is room
enough for all differences, so that one name cannot be confused with any
other, especially since all of them have or will soon be provided with their
own coded sign, something like a "cultural security" number. All of the
personages of world history can be found in this telephone book,
everything, in fact, but the possibility of carrying on history itself. The
history of Western society began as an epic, continued as a novel — and
now concludes as a telephone book.27
On the brink of the 1990s the American sociologist Francis Fukuyama
astounded the intellectual world with his prognosis about the end of
history due to the eradication of the last dichotomy—the global rivalry
between the democratic and communist political systems. Democracy
triumphed and became globalized (with the exception of tiny totalitarian
outposts such as North Korea, Iraq, Libya, and Cuba, which are shrinking
like shagreen leather). The stormy narratives of world history had a happy
ending, which is necessarily followed by a dull, potentially endless and
eventless existence: "They lived happily ever after." What goes on after
the end of history is no longer a sequence of events, changing significantly
during the course of time, but is only the sum total of disparate facts from
various fields: medicine, economics, law, etc. Telegraph agency reports
are full of such facts, but nothing has epoch-making significance because
no further change in epoch can be foreseen; only physical time and geocultural space remain. The world is approaching a placid state in which
there is no narrative, a nebulous hybrid genre somewhere between an
idyll and a telephone book. Such an end to world history seems somehow
more dismal than the apocalypse promised by the Russian visionaries of
the silver age -- Merezhkovsky, Berdiaev -- who reiterated John's
prophecy that "time would be no more." History, as T. S. Eliot once said,
will go out not with a bang, but with whimper. Of course, history could still
resume, Fukuyama supposes (quite in the spirit of Dostoyevsky's
Underground Man), if mankind, wretched and crazed in its democratic
boredom, decides to begin history anew. After all, man is a creature who
thrives on events, accustomed to setting up and summarily destroying the
boundaries of his own making. Perhaps the agony and insanity of an
eventless existence will become an event in itself, laying history's new

groundwork; that is, boredom will implode, much as nothingness must
have imploded, giving birth to our ever-expanding universe with the "Big
Bang."
The post-historical landscape, as conceived by the influential
postmodernist theoreticians Deleuze and Guattari, for example, is a
landscape without trees, with only an endlessly tangled, soft, and lowlying field of mushrooms. I refer here to their well-known conceptual
metaphor for the future, laid out in the introduction to the book A
Thousand Plateaus. If a tree represents a model of traditional Western
civilization, with its dualism, its binary system of valuation, and its logical
progression from cause to effect, then the rhizome, sprouting offshoots in
all directions, signifies the polysemantic nature of the new post-historical
order, with its incessant shifting of values and its nomadic encampments
("deterritorialization" and "nomadism" are two terms successfully
introduced into postmodern theory by these two authors). ". . . (U)nlike
trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point. . .
. It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle from which it
grows and which it overspills. It constitutes linear multiplicities
with n dimensions having neither subject nor object. . . . The rhizome is
an antigenealogy. It is a short-term memory, or antimemory."28 In spite
of this Deleuze and Guattari do not notice that in their characterization of
the two models, the tree model and the rhizome, they resort to the very
one they criticize so harshly -- the binary model of the trees -- clearly,
moreover, with a judgmental preference for one element of a dual
opposition over another. "Binary logic is the spiritual reality of the roottree." 29 The laws of binary, "tree-like" logic allow Deleuze and Guattari to
assert the superiority of "weeds." However, this paradox escapes the
perception of the two authors, who insist upon a new metaphor in its
head-on collision with the old.
Similarly, it is impossible not to notice that the examples on which
Jacques Derrida builds his theory of différance are still the very same old
oppositions: nature versus culture, consciousness versus unconsciousness,
the written word versus the spoken. In his article entitled "Différance"
Derrida writes "Thus one could reconsider all the pairs of opposites on
which philosophy is constructed and on which our discourse lives, not in
order to see opposition erase itself but to see what indicates that each of
the terms must appear as the différance of the other, as the other
different and deferred in the economy of the same (the intelligible as
differing-deferring the sensible, as the sensible different and deferred; the
concept as different and deferred, different and deferring intuition; culture
as nature different and deferred."30 But what sort of différance is this,

really, when we remain concerned with the all-too-familiar opposition
between the knowable and the sensible, culture and nature? Or take this
explanation from Of Grammatology: ". . .the trace whereof I speak is not
more natural . . . than cultural, no more physical than psychic, biological
than spiritual. It is that starting from which a becoming-unmotivated of
the sign, and with it all the ulterior oppositions between physis and its
other, is possible."31 Yet why is the "opposition" between nature and its
"other", and not between nature and its opposite? In fact, Derrida always
defines différance not in terms of actual difference, but precisely
in opposition to such traditional conceptions as logocentrism and the
metaphysics of presence.
What perspective, then, does the widening of this boundless middle space
provide, already almost totally devoid of edges and judgmental poles, as it
becomes more and more of a reality, if not in Western culture then at
least in its dominant theories? A continuous and superficial game of sign
differences without the transcendent signified resembles a colorful Mayan
blanket, which must be flung back to discover the reality behind it —
emptiness, an eternal nothing. The theory of deconstruction arouses such
keen interest among Eastern theologists (Japanese, Indian, etc.) because
it allows them to deconstruct all cultural realities from the "western"
viewpoint, uncovering the nothingness which lies at their core. In
Deconstruction Theory the apex of Western thought's critical/rationalistic
tradition comes full circle to meet the negativism of Eastern religions. If
we equalize the whole world of values on a relative basis, if we conceive it
as an infinitely motley and interminable tapestry of differences, then the
next impulse to grip transcendent thought, and indeed all eventful human
existence, will be to tear down that tapestry; there will be nothing behind
it besides Nothingness itself, because the entire world of realities will have
been reduced to the flatness of a simulacre.
Herein lies the danger of that tendency toward total neutralization which
germinated in Western culture as the progressive and interminable
widening of its middle zone, pushing back and engulfing its outer poles. If
everything elevated and lowly, sacred and sinful, is pulled into this middle
zone, if culture is stripped of its hierarchies and oppositions, if all
anomalies are equated with the norms, all centers with the periphery, all
great canons with the minor ones, everything elite with the masses, then
the opposite to this entire culture will shift into the realm of pure
nothingness. And then we can foresee that the next step in the theory and
practice of Western thought, after the conceptions of différance,
simulacre, and hyper-reality, will be "annihilation," playing with
nothingness, escape into this nothingness which will have become the only

alternative to a culture deprived of all oppositions. The uniformity which
was described by Mill and Herzen will pass into a Buddhist renunciation of
the world. Western man's existence and thought is impossible without
transcendence, without the crossing of boundaries, and if all such
boundaries are removed from culture, if culture becomes a uniform field of
differences, then the only boundary left in such an all-encompassing
middle will be nothingness. This median culture will plunge into it as soon
as it realizes the impossibility of obtaining transcendence from within.
The Ternary Model
Let us make a preliminary summary. The dual model may be destructive
of cultural diversity, may condense any or all intermediate zones, reduce
differences to nil and replace them with polarity and the battle of
opposites. Yet neither does the crumbling of differences to dust when
deprived of great dual tensions foster diversity. Dust tends toward
monotony, settles into a lump, returns to an amorphous, indivisible mass.
Russian thought put forth its own idea of a "third zone," but not so much
an intermediate, neutral zone as a sort of integral one, uniting all
antitheses. Soloviev's idea of total unity and global theocracy, the joining
of church and state; Merezhkovsky's "third testament" and "religious
community"; Rozanov's "saintly flesh"; Fiodorov's concept of a literal
resurrection of the dead and heaven on earth; Berdiaev's idea of the allencompassing act of creation and the establishment of a new heaven and
earth; all of these constitute projections of this third space as an allencompassing synthesis which resolved all cultural contradictions. I bring
to bear Merezhkovsky's words: "The unresolvable contradiction between
heaven and earth, flesh and spirit, the Father and the Son -- this forms
the boundary of Christianity, only of Christianity. The final resolution of
this contradiction, the ultimate union of the Father and the Son in the Holy
Spirit, forms the boundary of the Apocalypse. The revelation of the Holy
Spirit is holy flesh, holy land, holy community -- a theocracy, with the
church as the kingdom not only of heaven, but also of earth."32Obviously,
such a project takes us far beyond the framework of culture itself, and
represents religion's attempt to overcome culture. The very attempt to
merge the secular with the religious is a super-religious, or quasi-religious
act.
Having scaled the heights and the abyss of Russian polarity, Berdiaev
followed Merezhkovsky in wanting to dissolve it in something greater yet,
something which would lead to a deepening, rather than a resolution of
this polarity. Berdiaev writes: "We seek a church which could include all

the fullness of life. . . . This dualism (between the church and the world —
M.E.) can no longer be borne, it has become godless, it kills religious life. .
. . Everything we cherish and value should be able to be found in the
church. . . ."33 At the same time, Berdiaev remained completely aware
that by standing against dualism and its resolution on the medial,
"bourgeois" level of culture, he was dangerously close to supporting the
Bolshevik (or, as he put it, "Scythian") attack on the bourgeoisie. Thus
Berdiaev was constantly forced to delineate himself apart from
Scythianism -- his fierce hatred of the petty bourgeois middle was too
reminiscent of the Bolsheviks'. "In its struggle against mediocrity and
moderation, every culture will tend downward, toward the nether abyss,
rather than the chasm above. These modern Scythians sing hymns not to
a super-cultural, but to a pre-cultural condition."34 Yet Berdiaev himself is
fighting against the mediocrity in any culture: "The creative impulse aimed
upward becomes weighed down by the world and falls. We create cultural
values instead of a new being, books and paintings and institutions
instead new life, instead of a new world. Culture, books, paintings, and
institutions belittle life itself. . . ."35 It happened just so, that two colliding
critiques — the Scythian critique of culture "from below" and Berdiaev's
"from above" -- came together historically in the Russian Revolution,
which destroyed the entire "middle" culture and, consequently, came to be
a crude yet precise parody of the anticipated apocalypse. As a result of
the efforts made by Berdiaev and his confederates to overcome the
dualism in Russian culture apocalyptically, it was not only unconquered,
but was terribly strengthened, since every fine middle layer of culture had
been destroyed anyway. Instead of the anticipated union between the
spirit and the flesh, between the churchly and the worldly, there came
about, on the one hand, a ruined economy and the decay of soulless flesh
trapped by militant materialism, and on the other the drying up of
disembodied spirits, poised at the pinnacles of culture toward even greater
heights, toward the realm of militant eschatology.36
The idea of a "third creative testament" or the "testament of the Holy
Spirit," which Merezhkovsky and Berdiaev proclaimed and which echoed
so resoundingly in the silver age, is dangerous in the sense that by
combining religiosity and the social drive, the depths of the spirit and the
depths of the flesh, it becomes intoxicated with this imminent unity and
shuns the sober difference between religion and society, thus precluding
the very possibility of secularization. Indeed, according to Merezhkovsky,
even the monastic life of spiritual asceticism is a lie, as is the state, since
religiosity and the social drive should not exist in isolation from one
another. The superiority of the "third testament" lies in its resolution of
the contradictions in the first and second testaments; it erases the

contrast between the godly and the human through the power of the Holy
Spirit. Yet such a "hyper-existent" resolution of contradictions brings us
back to the pre-existent condition of the world, when it contained nothing
but the Spirit itself, floating above the abyss; there is no distinction
between light and darkness, heaven and earth, dry land and sea. This
unifying Third is brought in to replace the Trinity itself, reducing it to One.
Yet therein lies the essential truth of the ternary model; it cannot be
reduced to the third 'state' (in terms of Merezhkovsky's and Berdiaev's
definition), which supposedly unites in itself the first and the second. The
ternary model is always greater than the third. In this the ternary model
differs from Hegel's triad, where the "third" is a synthesis greater by
definition than the thesis and the antithesis, thereby negating their
opposition within itself. The ternary can be reduced neither to polarity nor
to unity, but presupposes the indivisibility and incompatibility of three,
including the incompatibility of (1) the religious, (2) the social, and (3) the
socio-religious; the corporeal, the spiritual, and the corporo-spiritual. No
whole can or should negate the separateness of its components, or more
precisely, its perimeters. No synthesis can ever quite reconcile the thesis
and the antithesis, eradicate their essential opposition. A synthesis exists
alongside the thesis and antithesis, not in their stead. A synthesis can
absorb the thesis and antithesis only incompletely; they remain beyond
the boundaries of synthesis, just as they skirt the edges of their medial
link, their plectrum. Neither unification nor mediation can exhaust every
possible relation of the thesis and antithesis to each other: relations of
irony and the grotesque, parody and paradox, ambivalence and
tragicomedy. Neither the grandiose, harmonic synthesis nor the
businesslike, efficient middle zone can contain that which is revealed in
the direct interaction of thesis and antithesis -- the irony and tragedy of
their inversion, their transposition, their mutual amplification.
This is why, in speaking of the ternary model, it is crucial to differentiate it
from the unitary one, whether in its neutral-intermediate or in its
integrated, unifying permutation (the model associated with Hegel and
Soloviev). The elevated and the lowly are mediated, but cannot be
reduced to their median; they can unite in some third, integrated state,
but cannot be reduced to it. Otherwise we are left with the crude division
between mediocracy and ideocracy, with a bourgeois culture or
totalitarianism. Both Russian religious thought, which sought to resolve
the opposition between "God and the world" or "Christ and this life" in the
third testament, synthesizing the "spirit" and the "flesh"; and Western
secular thought, seeking an objective middle zone where reason could be
affirmed upon its own neutral foundation ("neither to cry nor to laugh, but

to understand" — Spinoza), never generated a specifically ternary model
for the development of culture. Neither the Aristotelian model (the third as
median, as moderation) nor the Hegelian (the third as One, as synthesis)
can resolve the enigma of the Trinity, because it really cannot be resolved,
if by resolution one means some sort of simplification, a reduction to two
or to one. Neither the first, in the capacity of median, nor the latter, in the
capacity of a Whole, can exhaust every possible interrelation within the
Trinity.
Overall the ternary model has not yet been duly explored in the study of
the humanities. Neither the recognized dialectics (Hegel's positive
dialectic, or the Frankfurt School 's negative one), nor Nils Bor's concept
of supplementation, or the structuralist view of binary opposition, or the
idea of mediation, achieves the comprehensive richness of the ternary
model. All of them reduce the tension between antitheses either to
synthesis or to an intermediate link (a plectrum or an inter-thesis); or
they leave them in a state of pressured confrontation, as inveterate
contradiction and negation (Theodore Adorno); or else they stop on the
very fact of dualistic opposition as the source of all meaningful distinctions
among the elements. At the same time the third is either excluded or, on
the contrary, replaces the first two strictly polar elements, in the name of
either mediation (the neutral zone) or totalization (the merging of
opposites). Yet the truth is that all three of these relations unfold and
interact between the poles, and none of them is reducible to the others:
(1) mediation (the model of Western worldly culture); (2) totalization (the
German philosophical or Russian religious synthesis); and -- the least
theoretically developed type -- (3) direct interaction and inverse of the
poles (opposition, inversion, transposition, and substitution).
Along with all of this, the introduction of an intermediate, "worldly" zone
into the ternary model may preclude some kinds of direct oppositional
interrelation, but preserve others. For instance, the resolution of the
neutral zone might prevent a revolutionary inversion of the poles, when
the absolute dominion of one is replaced by the same absolute dominion
of the other. The middle layer keeps these poles in balance and prevents
one from dominating the other, since this domination would require
opposing not only the opposite pole, but also the middle zone, the mass
and resistivity of which are too great to dominate successfully. In the
ternary model the neutral zone generally owes its growth to political,
social, juridical, and economic institutions, which fully take on a worldly
character, separating themselves equally from both positive and negative
(inverted, atheistic) religions. On the other hand, in the sphere of spiritual
culture and private life (morality, religion, art, philosophy, all the different

areas of human interest) direct interaction between the poles is retained
(1) on the level of their distinction (i.e., the moral choice between good
and evil, asceticism and hedonism, etc.); (2) on the level of their various
combinations and transpositions (parody, grotesque); and (3) on the level
of their paradoxical mutual augmentation when the extreme (or the flipside) of stupidity becomes wisdom, when loquacity harbors silence, when
filth turns into godly purity, etc. The middle zone prevents only the
absolute dominion of one pole over another, not their transpositions and
interactions. And conversely, the pressured opposition of these poles,
passing into their paradoxical/ambivalent/grotesque forms of interaction,
lessens the danger of violent, revolutionary subordination of one to the
other.
The direct, unmediated relation of positive to negative, the elevated to the
lowly (for example, wisdom and folly) consists, first of all, of a serious
opposition of values (the opposition of wisdom and folly as presented, for
example, in the teachings of King Solomon); second, it entails their
revolutionary inversion (the fool ruling the wise man, and instructing
him); third, their parodied mutual substitution (the fool takes on the guise
of a wise man, the wise man pretends to be foolish); fourth, their
grotesque juxtaposition (wise words combined with foolish actions); fifth,
their paradoxical conversion, so that seemingly foolish words conceal the
deepest wisdom, while wise teachings reveal pride and vainglory. Indeed,
it is written that "the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God" (1
Corinthians 3:19 ), and conversely, foolishness of the "Socratic" or "idiot"
type might contain a well of wisdom. All five indications — polarity,
revolution, parody, the grotesque, and the paradoxical -- are
characteristic of Russian culture and create a wealth of meaning especially
for the dualistic model, which cannot be realized in a neutral zone, but
demands direct interaction between the poles. Heaven and hell, the
sacred and the sinful can correlate in both a mediated and a direct way,
as a passing through purgatory and as a headlong fall. Tragedy and
comedy fit not in a neutral zone, but along the harsh line dividing "the
ideal of Sodom " and "the ideal of the Madonna," as does a fundamental
and inadequately studied category of Russian culture, the tragicomedy.
Nor is that ambivalence which is considered a particular feature of Russian
culture a neutralization; on the contrary, it indicates the strengthening of
both poles when faced with the possibility of transposition, so that love
turns into jealousy and hatred, pride into shame and repentance, etc. The
dualistic model is remarkable not for the struggle of opposites -- for such
a struggle actually bespeaks a tendency to monism, to one extreme
crowding out the other -- but a growing tension between poles, even their
mutual tragic amplification, as well as their comic superpositions,

absurdities, and substitutions.
Inversion as a Category of Russian Culture
A certain misleading gesture is characteristic of Russian culture —
distortions and substitutions, when a visible object presupposes something
quite opposite to its apparent nature. In the most general sense, this
distorting mechanism can be characterized as irony or mockery, but it is
important to underscore that this irony is rather objective than subjective;
it is brought to bear when circumstances mock a person, when all of his
plans turn inside out and against him. Western categories of "irony" (such
as romantic irony, when the subject endlessly surpasses himself) or
"alienation," when as a result of a long and objective historical process,
man's creation separates itself and acquires its own power over him, do
not quite apply here. They are akin to stepping on a rake and hitting
oneself in the forehead. Russian historical experience has summarized this
effect in a single common yet clever phrase, literally "what once we fought
for, now we trip over."
Let us call this most common quality in Russian culture "inversion," when
some store of pent-up effort is momentarily turned inside-out, its effect
directed the opposite way. Russian history is rich with such inversions, the
most obvious of which was the Bolshevik Revolution and the most recent
being the August putsch. The inversion is not simply an overturn, when
opposing sides, top and bottom, change places. If such an overturn had
actually occurred in 1917, there would have been no so-called
"dictatorship of the proletariat," no collectivization, no party-ocracy or the
Lenin-Stalin regime. That was not an overturn, but an inversion -- an
overturn that cruelly mocked the very meaning of overturn, when the
dregs, having risen to the top, became even more lawless and
impoverished, while the elevated ones, having fallen, were forced beyond
the country's borders into an alien existence, or even non-existence. For
instance, when Lopakhin becomes master of the "Cherry Orchard" where
his ancestors had toiled as serfs, it seems like a simple, "normal"
overturn. But one can imagine what would have happened to the
Lopakhins after 1917; even if they survived in the guise of certified
peasants, the descendents of serfs, what would have become of them
after 1929 as members of the "Kulak element," as the mechanism of
"overturn" continued to come undone? As the writer Vladimir Sharov
remarks about Chekhov's characters, "in those early years (the first
overturn -- M.E.) they didn't think it would be a ball that kept rolling and
rolling… they saw a simple cube, which would flip from one face to another
and then stay perfectly still."37 The Russian model is not a cube flipped

from side to side, but a spinning ball. Various Russian colloquialisms, from
the words "idiosyncratic" to "stern," are literal variations of the word for
"spinning." What spins in one direction can easily be untwisted in the
other.
One of the latest of these inversions, so characteristic of Russian culture,
is conceptualism, which proposes its own means to battle the Platonic
ecstasies of the fatherland's history and ideology. This can be done the
Aristotelian way, as Sergei Averintsev proposes in his aforementioned
work, or the Sorokhinian way, the Prigovian way, etc., without
neutralizing, but rather inverting the Platonic discourse. Conceptualism
inverts Soviet ideology (as well as Russian psychology, and in a sense,
that of all the world's cultures) in such a way as to push its values to an
extreme, to some sort of ecstasy which, as soon as it reaches the
terminus of its momentum, immediately inverts itself toward the exact
opposite pole of cynical mockery. The conceptual world feeds on such
bipolarity (that is, the art of eccentricities, overturns, fits of hysterical
laughter). The contemporary conceptualist prosaist Vladimir Sorokin
defines his writing method thus: ". . .I am seeking some sort of harmony
between two styles, trying to join the high and the low. The attempt to
unite opposites is a dialectical act for me and flows out into the symbiosis
of textual strata."38 It might be more accurate to say that the union of
the elevated and the base in Sorokin's prose rests not on harmony, but on
the spinning and inversion of the poles. The same image unravels itself
from one extreme to the other.
In any case, for the purpose of straightening our view, it appears no less
productive to read Plato and Sorokin simultaneously, peering suspiciously
from one to the other, than it is to read Aristotle. Let us try, then, to place
Plato's dialogue on "Politics" side by side with Sorokin's book The Norm.
In Plato we read:
"Stranger: 'It is difficult, my dear Socrates, to demonstrate anything of
real importance without the use of paradigm. / . . ./ Example, my good
friend, has been found to require an example. / . . . / We have tried to
discover the nature of example in general by studying a small and
particular example of an example. /. . . / Well, then, what example is
there on a really small scale which we can take and set beside statehood,
and which, because it comprises an activity common to it and to
statehood can be of real help to us in findingwhat we are looking for?"39
In The Norm40Sorokin demonstrates this diversity of the little norms that

make up the lives of ordinary Soviet citizens, who in turn comprise the
one vast norm of the state.
"She sat once again, opened the desk drawer:
—I'll never manage the norm.
—Just do it.
Olia took out the packet containing the remains of the norm, began to
pinch off pieces and eat them." (14)
"Down there the swollen, water-logged norm was floating, bumping up
against the granite.
—Len, what is that, some sort of brick…?
—Wait, that's the norm.
The young man's face became serious." (30)
On the packet the word NORM was printed in red. The packet was slightly
torn. Georgii peeked inside.
—The norm… of all things. . . — Ekaterina Borisovna sighed.
—Can I look at it, Auntie Kate? — Georgii was turning the packet over and
over in his hands." (51).
If, having read Sorokin, we turn back to re-read Plato, then the latter's
words about "knowing the nature of the norm through its parts" and "the
small satisfying norm" will also acquire a certain additional, "conceptual"
meaning — that very meaning which unites our experience of the
Communist construction with Plato's utopian state. And it will become
clear that Sorokin's play on the concept of "the norm," which the citizens
of the Most Normal State are forced to swallow, suppressing their
revulsion at its taste and smell, corresponds marvelously to Aristotle's
critique of Plato's teachings about ideas. According to Aristotle, Plato
duplicates the physical world in the world of ideas in vain, because these
ideas are empty categories, adding nothing to the things they represent;
yet, as Plato's social teaching makes evident, ideas still demand sacrifices
of society, of real people. Perhaps Aristotle and Sorokin are not so
divergent in their anti-Platonic worldviews -- this "philosopher," the
primary tutor of European thought, and the self-proclaimed "monster of
Russian literature."
Of course, one cannot fail to agree with Averintsev that Platonic ecstasies
proved to be the bane of Russian history, culminating in the literally

realized project of a communist state. The failure of Soviet Marxism was,
essentially, the failure of historical Platonism the world over, of the long
quest for the kingdom of ideas incarnated on earth.41Pointing to Aristotle,
Averintsev touches the sore spot in contemporary Russia 's selfawareness. In such a blind rush toward some unknown goal, century after
century, the moment of truth is missed. One regrets the lost centuries,
regrets that in Russia "the meeting with Aristotle just didn't
happen."42 But the question is, can one begin anew and, having given up
the Platonic line of thought, push Russian mentality back to that historical
point where it is possible once again to assimilate Aristotle organically? Is
this not the same as proclaiming post-Soviet Russia the spiritual
descendent of Kievan Russia, and forgetting Batyi and Lenin like a bad
dream? Or is there no other foundation to build upon besides these very
same smoking Soviet ruins, besides the funereal Platonic trenches which
appeared instead of the ideal Platonic state -- that is, can one carry on
only from one's own end, and not from another's beginning?
If this is so, then conceptualism, that frivolous techno-babble replacing
the stately ruins of Platonism, appears quite an appropriate, even an
"organic" way out of the collapsed aluminum castle, a moment of clarity, a
keen re-assignment of all native historical ugliness to a foolish and furtive
art. Conceptualism became so fundamental to contemporary Russian
culture because in its very essence this is a culture of spinning,
overturning conceptions. The Russian tradition of inversion works to
subvert Platonism here, instead of the neutral thought-mechanism to
which Averintsev appeals in the Western/Aristotelian system. One
extreme answers the other. Of course, Prigov and Rubenstein, Sorokin
and Kibirov are no Aristotles; their only, maybe ludicrous merit lies in
their beginning from exactly the same spot where Soviet history left all of
us. To stay put does not seem like much of a distinction, but in these
authors, who appeared to freeze on command at the final threshold of the
Soviet epoch, one can acknowledge a certain sentry-like dignity, or even
the dignity of posts rooted deeply in the soil of their time.
Secularity and Banality
Yet why go to ancient Greece for the "rule of moderation" when Russia
has its own Aristotles—that line of moderate realism which corresponds
with political liberalism and with the attempt to build an ethic and an
aesthetic upon a social foundation. While Averintsev writes of Christian
Aristotelianism, there was one who was not Christian, not religious at all.
Russia even has its "Aristotle" in the most characteristic area of culture—
in belles-lettres. The acknowledged bearer of this title in the Russian

pantheon is Chekhov, who wrote: "I lost my faith somewhere long ago,
and can only be perplexed by any intelligent believer… The religious
movement is one thing, and all of modern culture is another. . . . Today's
culture has begun to work toward a great future, and the religious
movement (mysticism and Merezhkovsky's "neo-Christianity") is a relic
living out its last days."43 Anton Pavlovich Chekhov is a dependable shield
against all manner of Platonic ecstasies, the ecstasies of Tolstoy and
Dostoyevsky, Berdiaev and Merezhkovsky. As the last great preRevolutionary liberal, Miliukov, wrote, "mental sobriety and the discipline
of common sense protected Chekhov from all manner of utopias and
illusions."44 Chekhov's modesty endears him to Russians as a banner of
their ripening secular culture. If Pushkin concludes Russia 's first period of
secularization, then Chekhov begins the second, after Gogol and Belinsky,
after Dostoyevsky, after Tolstoy. But this second secularization was never
actually achieved -- it was cut short by an anti-religious revolution. For
precisely this reason, we need Chekhov now as never before. In the words
of Dmitri Shalin, "Now more than ever before we need a theory and, more
important, a practice not just of 'small' but of 'the very smallest acts'. . . .
This practice of intelligence and decency dates back to Stankevich,
Granovsky, Chicherin, Chekhov, Gershenzon, Struve, and every other
Russian liberal both of the last century and of this one who acknowledged
the fact that civic society and civility are, in the end, one and the
same."45
Chekhov turned out to be a sort of untouchable figure in Russian culture
by the very virtue of his seeming moderation. Chekhov suffers in an
imperfect world but does not permit himself to guide its course. The cult
of Chekhov has outlasted Tolstoy's and Gorky's, Lenin's and Stalin's, and
will outlast many more cults, of writers and non-writers alike. Dmitri
Galkovsky remarks, "In light of the conditions that have grown up around
Chekhov's name, writing about this person means surrendering one's own
dignity. It's indecent. This is it, Chekhov has already been 'done'. . . .
Even Pushkin scholars, all right, something human will occasionally
(occasionally) come through, but Chekhov . . . is a banner."46 The banner
of Russian secular culture is indeed this "most human of men," without
pomp or ideological magic tricks. But if we want to determine the secular
future of Russian culture we must understand why it wasn't realized in
Chekhov, why it was interrupted mid-sentence. We will have to "undo" the
already "finished" Chekhov -- "undo" used in the Western sense of
another verb, so ponderous-sounding in Russian: "to deconstruct."
Chekhov remains the most secular of Russian writers, yet his work
presents a scathing critique of secularity under the name of "common

vulgarity" and "Philistinism." Thus, in terms of his artistic fate, Chekhov is
the most well-off and "well-rounded" of Russian writers. As Victor Erofeev
notes, "his secret is that he pleased everyone. He pleased the Reds and
the Whites, progressives and conservatives, atheists and churchgoers,
moralists and cynics. Moreover, Chekhov is readily accepted by two
traditionally irreconcilable currents of Russian thought: the Westernizers
and the Slavophiles. In this regard Chekhov is truly unique."47 Erofeev
himself doesn't offer a solution to this riddle, except to say that Chekhov's
ideas were so widespread and self-evident that no one could disagree with
them; that is, the author was as banal as his characters. Yet while no one
agrees with Chekhov's characters when they want to cultivate gooseberry
bushes in their small garden, everyone agrees with Chekhov, who says
that gooseberries are not enough for true and complicated happiness.
Everyone understands that the sight of people trapped in a cage is
common and repulsive. But at the end of the short story, when the
veterinarian Ivan Ivanovich begins to hold forth against caged men, he is
himself capable of expressing nothing but commonplace banalities. ". . .To
tolerate insults and humiliations, to dare not say that you side with free,
honest people, and to lie yourself, to smile, all for a piece of bread, for a
warm corner, for some little bureaucrat who's not worth two cents — no, I
cannot live this way anymore!" This sounds trite, though not repulsive.
But Chekhov understands perfectly well that within the framework of his
own secular worldview it is hard to criticize repulsive commonplaces from
any perspective but that of some other, nobler commonplaces. Therefore
he makes the following move, which lays bare his most "Chekhovian"
quality. The teacher Burkin's retort to Ivan Ivanovich's noble
commonplace closes the story: "'Well now, you're coming from a different
opera, Ivan Ivanovich,' said the teacher. 'Let's go to bed.'"
This retort is not especially expressive, but it alone rings true from the
writer's strategic perspective. Chekhov lets us know that Ivan Ivanovich's
speeches are also pompous and trite -- "from a different opera." What sort
of speech, then, is not trite? Silence. Burkin suggests going to sleep; that
is, he returns words to their subjective meaning, their "utilitarian
function," thus putting an end to speech, making it obsolete. The
characters go up to bed --this concludes their conversations and
Chekhov's conversation with the reader. That is, to surpass the
boundaries of repulsive banality and its opposing noble banality, one can
only be silent and give in to a state of natural banality, so to speak -sleeping, eating, breathing. This is the third and final level to which we are
led no longer by Chekhov's words, but by Chekhov's silence.
And this is why everyone loves Chekhov, and why he satisfies everyone:

with Chekhov one can crusade against banality and simultaneously recline
on its soft bed; be noble and natural at the same time; rail against the
well-fed Philistines and at the same time eat with relish oneself, because
when Chekhov eats, he is also silent — in Merezhkovsky's words, "a holy
silence with regard to holiness." So the noble Merezhkovsky comes to
Chekhov to share his hatred for the Philistines and strikes up a
conversation about eternity, about the meaning of life, about "the single
teardrop of a suffering child, which cannot be forgiven" — and in reply
Chekhov suggests ordering the hot-pot at Testov's, and not to forget a
large bottle of vodka. At first, Merezhkovsky confesses that "I was
disappointed, even hurt: here I was speaking to him of eternity, while he's
going on about his hot-pot. It was irritating, this indifference, even
seeming contempt for universal questions."48 But soon even
Merezhkovsky sees the light and is moved: it turns out that the hot-pot
stood for no more and no less than an entire system of apophatic silence
about the most important things. From which it follows: "How joyful, how
blessed it is to keep silent about the sacred."49 Such is the current of
Russian thought: it can find nothing better to bring forth against
"catophatic" banality than "apophatic" banality. As an alternative to a hotpot accompanied by Philistine conversation and elevated conversation
minus the hot-pot we get the hot-pot and a weighty silence. In Chekhov ,
Russia found its secular ideal — a secularity which defuses the culture's
religious tension and simultaneously, in accordance with the culture's
religious programming, comes forth as a critique of secularity. The result
of this secular critique of secularity was, of course, not the flowering of
social civilization, but rather absolute zero, a full-weight zero which
silently appears to contain in itself the absolute.
Let us recall the short story "The House With the Mezzanine": the
protagonist, an idle artist, is in love with a girl whose older sister, Lida, is
a zealous activist in the field of rural enlightenment, fussing over hospitals
and schools for the peasants. What happens? Chekhov chuckles a little at
the artist, but even more so at the dry and callous 'activist,' who cannot
accept the artist's delicate love for her sister and whisks the girl far away
from this loafer. What sort of social civilization could grow up in a country
whose most prominent social writer dreams of such civilization blossoming
on the one hand, and on the other condemns it as banal and Philistine? He
condemns a doctor for being nothing but a doctor ("Ionich," "A Dull Tale"),
a landowner for being nothing but a landowner ("Uncle Vanya"), a teacher
for only being a teacher ("The Literature Teacher"), the summer-cottage
dweller for being nothing else (various stories and plays). The same thing
takes place in "The Cherry Orchard": on the one hand we have
Ranevskaya and Gaiev, with their aristocratic mythology and lyricism; on

the other we have Lopakhin, with his mercantile pragmatism. Chekhov
points up the inadequacies of both — he is a social writer who, deep
down, both loves and despises society. This was the Bolsheviks' reason for
co-opting Chekhov into the ranks of their confederates, especially when
taking a third force into accoun t— the phrase-mongering jester Petya
Trofimov, who has a slight revolutionary past, but perhaps a great future.
In Vladimir Sharov's novel How Can I Not Regret. . . , Trofimov's fate is
thus projected: "In the play he was already going bald, but here it is,
1917, and Trofimov's fortunes take a sharp upward turn. . . . In the
district he will start out heading the Cheka, move on the Party Committee,
and then he will be summoned to Moscow , where he will go into law
practice."50 The antitheses of society and anti-banality produced a
synthesis in the form of a society which could provide a non-banal,
historically universal solution -- that is, in the form of Bolshevism, of a
man no longer holding Gaiev's billiards cue or Lopakhin's country ax, but a
rifle and a banner.
Alas, Chekhov's social criticism of banality and Philistinism had only one
possible resolution, only one way out—from behind a barricade. Since
society came forth as a positive antithesis to religion ("survival"), society
itself became rejected as the embodiment of banality and Philistinism; the
result of such a "rejection of rejection" could only be religious conviction
of supreme worldliness -- that is, the church of Belinsky and Lenin, antireligious construction on a grandiose religious scale, the religious
consecration of the social idea. Therefore the Bolsheviks' conclusions
about Chekhov proved more correct than Merezhkovsky's; he was ready
only to join Chekhov in holy silence about everything holy, while the
Bolsheviks were eager to demonstrate how beautiful life on earth would
be in five hundred years, and how a diamond-studded sky could be turned
into "little lamps for Lenin." These are no longer the small crusades of Lida
Volchaninova, but such great social crusades that they become socialist,
removing the antithesis from society and religion and merging one into
the other.
Chekhov's paired images of feckless dreamers and narrow-minded
pragmatists recall the interrelation between Goncharov's characters
Oblomov and Schtoltz; here was another preeminent Russian social writer
who also pleased everyone, especially with the character of "Oblomov." As
a social writer, Goncharov cannot help but to be enraptured by Schtoltz,
with his European, enterprising nature. But as a Russian writer,
Goncharov cannot fail to show the pettiness and inadequacies of precisely
this sort of social activism. In effect, then, doing nothing, like Oblomov, is
wrong, but doing something, like Schtoltz, is also not too admirable.

Would that one could "do everything," solve all the world's problems at
once -- but alas, this third option is not permitted. It is not permitted to
anyone except social radicals, who enjoyed such success in Russia
precisely because they addressed secular questions on a religious scale;
instead of fussing around a gooseberry bush, they undertook a re-working
of the soil itself. Happy-go-lucky Russian idleness and petty Western
pragmatism came together in this doing of everything.
Chekhov is not just a social, but a socio-apophatic writer. He came up
with a way to utter banalities with impunity, even eliciting compassion for
his sorrow, as though implying that something underlies these banalities,
some sort of breakthrough, a hope, a diamond-studded sky, etc., but that
this could not be stated directly, since any words would come out trite,
and so once again one could only grieve and hope. As an aside, the
immortal phrase "the frost quickened," with which Chekhov rewards the
hackneyed writer Vera Iosievna, wife of the tiresome Ivan Petrovich
Turkin, in the short story "Ionich" -- this phrase is very typical of
Chekhov. In the same story we encounter gems quite worthy of Vera
Iosievna's pen: "the torchlight of the moon"; "in every grave you feel the
presence of a secret, promising a calm, beautiful, eternal life"; "the
moonlight inflamed his passion. . . . "51 Chekhov learned to write phrases
along the lines of "rain dotted the courtyard" (from "Ionich") in such a
way that revealed a gentle mockery of their inherent banality.
In those rare instances when he actually does try to say something of his
own, to express fully his worldview, he ends up with true rhetorical
banalities, now devoid of any sorrow whatsoever, such as: "I hate
dishonesty and violence in any form. . . . My holy of holies is the human
body, mind, talent, inspiration, love, and absolute freedom."52 Here
Chekhov speaks no better than his own characters, such as Ivan
Ivanovich or Doctor Astrov, who pronounced: "Everything in man should
be beautiful: face, clothing, soul, thoughts. . . " Both of these well-known
formulations of the Chekhovian ideal are striking in their enumerative
tone, reminiscent of greeting cards, anniversary salutations, or the
perfunctory closing lines of a letter: "Dear friend! We are enraptured by
your wit and talent and wish you happiness, health, love, inspiration, and
great creative success!" As a matter of fact, Chekhov was himself a
master of this epistolary genre. Chekhov's "social ideal" lacks any sort of
meaningful tension; it is purely enumerative and could easily be a any list
of "good" things: "The human body, the mind, talent, interesting books,
heart-to-heart talks, good food, acacias in bloom, a little cottage by the
Black Sea, sunshine, seagulls, salt-lipped kisses . . . love and the most

absolute freedom."
As for Astrov's timeless aphorism "everything should be beautiful" (so
frequently quoted that is no longer associated with the character, but with
the author himself), it applies to Elena Andreyevna Serebriakova in "Uncle
Vanya," the one of whom it is said in the next sentence: "She is lovely,
there's no question of that, but… all she does is eat, sleep, take walks,
enchant us all with her beauty . . . and nothing else."53 That is, even for
Chekhov the socialite, it is not enough for beauty to embody everything
good -- it must also serve some purpose. Wherever Chekhov the thinker
subscribes to the virtue of 'good deeds' and activism as a social ideal,
Chekhov the writer demonstrates the banality of the social ideal. But
despite all this Chekhov's words remain within the rigid, now almost
canonical perimeters of banality, which are made apparent only by the
sudden leaps from one level of banality to another, from "everything
should be beautiful" to "let's go to bed." Here, for instance, Astrov
addresses Voinitsky in "Uncle Vanya": "Yes, chum. In this whole district
there were only two decent, intelligent people: me and you. But in these
last ten years or so this philistine, contemptible life drew us in; it polluted
our blood with its foul vapors, and we became just as shallow as the rest
of them. (Hastily) But don't try to change the subject on me now. You
give me back what you took from me."54 With that little word "hastily"
Chekhov immediately changes this trite monologue about banality from a
high to a low register. And so it goes everywhere in Chekhov's writing:
banality stands out in relief only against the background of another
banality, creating the illusion of contrast and shade, as one would pass
from twilight into deeper darkness.
Chekhov had a remarkable ability to "seduce" into banality even writers
whose work contrasted his in every way; for example, Merezhkovsky, who
dedicated his sketch "The Asphodel and the Daisy" to Chekhov, meant
that the latter was a pure and simple daisy among all the decadent
asphodels. Is "Chekhov as the Daisy" not terribly trite? In response to his
wife's requests to drop the mocking tone in his letters and to speak,
finally, from the heart, Chekhov answered, "But what is there, really, for
us to talk about, o crocodile of my heart? I already love you anyway."
Everyone from Bunin to Gorky found Chekhov's habit of laughing off
serious questions sweet; one imagined some underlying depth of feeling
('he suffered in silence, he understood more than anyone. . .'). It took a
new generation of Russian writers, it seems, to find the key to Chekhov
and to understand that the great exposer of banality was in fact himself
quite on the level of what he denounced and grieved over. But such
exposes of Chekhov -- "hypocrite!" -- also smack of Chekhov's eternal

banality, from which there seems to be no escape. Even in exposing it one
finds himself repeating Chekhov's lines: "Yes, my lad . . . the philistine life
is sucking us in. . . ." One simply cannot discuss Dostoyevsky, Gogol, or
Pushkin on the same level as Chekhov -- they demand a different
discourse.
Generally, "banality" is a crucial category in Russian culture, a negative
signifier of the "average" or "middle ground" and hence so difficult to
translate into other European languages. Nabokov's frequent use of this
concept of "banality" underscores its untranslateability, bespeaks his
identification with Russian culture despite all the apparent "Westernness"
of his artistic etiquette, so far removed from all these hysterical chasmgazers, all these Dostoyevskys and Merezhkovskys. The constant
references to "banality" -- the banality of Freudians, Marxists, humanists,
romantics, realists, Goethe, Sartre, Pasternak, etc. -- all reveal Nabokov
to be a quintessentially Russian writer.55 The disappearance of "banality"
and "Philistinism" as categories from the front lines of the cultural
dialogue will mark Russian culture's tentative acceptance of the 'middle'
as a positive category.
The Demonic
And so, the poles in Russian culture do not so much move apart and make
room for neutral space as they come together and join, creating
unbelievable tension at their boundary, making it both threshold and
precipice. The ideals of Sodom and the Madonna unite in a single heart,
and the result (as Dostoyevsky tells us) is a rupture in the salon, a
rupture in the peasant hut, and a rupture under the open sky. Russian
culture is characterized by inversion and rupture, when opposites are not
mediated or united in harmony, but rather generate extreme tension
which "ruptures" its bearer -- that is, weakens him to the same degree to
which he carries inside himself this conjoining force that tears him apart.
The words "strain" and "rupture" contain a semantic opposition: on the
one hand is the excessive tension between forces pulling in opposite
directions; on the other are the damage and collapse resulting from
unbearable tension. Power crosses its threshold, exceeds its measure.
Russia is breaking open, with its vast expanses being eaten away by
emptiness from the inside. Wide is the land, wide is the man. . . .
Everything exceeds the measure and yet doesn't quite reach it either.
More and less than necessary, because the fault-line lies along the center,
through the coordinates of norm and measure. Only an explosion can
unite the poles -- that is, an excess even greater than that contained in
the poles themselves. For that third element which conjoins thesis and

antithesis is actually neither synthesis nor middle ground, but an even
greater extreme in relation to both. The heart that houses both ideals of
Sodom and the Madonna is not a purgatory but a monster, simultaneous
heaven and hell; it should not exist. The very ideals of Sodom and the
Madonna are not so opposite in relation to each other as their combination
is in relation to both. "Here," in Dostoyevsky's words, "quote." The main
contradiction is not between the poles as such, but between their polarity
(so comprehensible and monosemantic) and their incredible combination
in one heart. This is not mediation, the smoothing and reconciliation of
extremes, but is, on the contrary, an outlet to an even greater extreme,
which elicits horror even from Dmitri Karamazov -- and Russians call this
the beauty that underlies culture. "Beauty is a awful and terrifying thing! .
. . The horror of it is that beauty is not just terrifying, but also a
mysterious thing."56
Russian culture is this "mysterious thing." The very existence of the
culture entails an impossible rupture, because between the church, on the
one hand, and the somnolent vegetation and demonic sport on the other,
there is nothing. Andrei Tarkovsky expresses this vividly in his film "Andrei
Rubliev": the claustrophobic interior of the church, surrounded by atrocity
and emptiness outside. "Either/or." There is no place for culture; there is
only the razor blade that slices it apart. There is only a threshold which
cannot be trodden, only crossed. Russian culture shatters along the very
line it crosses. Where parts should grow together, a new split occurs. After
all, Dostoyevsky does not even mention the existence of decent people
between the ideals of Sodom and the Madonna, people who sin, who
improve themselves, people of the world — the social ideal or the
bourgeois reality. No: there is a distinct Sodom and a distinct Madonna,
and the truly horrifying mystery is that they can coexist within a single
person. In this torn and rupturing culture, "terrible" beauty conjoins
extremes rather than accepting them. It crosses the fault-line at an even
pace: church and the world, czar and the people, the aristocracy and the
peasants, the intelligentsia and the uneducated; there is no way to fill in
this crack. The reforms of Peter the Great added a new split to the old
ones, the split between the West and the Russia inside Russia . Belinsky,
Gogol... all are phenomena of this rupture in Russian culture, when one
extreme becomes another, wild laughter turns into prayer, and love for
mankind freezes on the lips in a curse.
In contemporary literature as well, everything creatively appreciable
becomes immediately polarized -- not along the lines of social classes, in
monosemantic opposition to each other, but precisely along the line of an
inner split. After all, even that thickening toxicity which is often identified

as the ruling tendency in modern literature, its post-Soviet decadence -graphic realism, sadism, aggression, sexual deviance, absurdity, foul
language, violence, cannibalism, necrophilia -- in the writings of Mamleev,
Sorokin, Petrushevskaya, Sharov, Nabrikova, Erofeev, Pelevin -- all of it
remains indicative of the same rupture, taken to some new level. One
cannot agree that this contemporary literary "black magic" is being set off
against the "white magic" of its classical traditions. Such a juxtaposition is
made on both sides -- as much by those critics who denounce the new
literature for its deviation from humanist ideals as by those who are happy
to hold yet another funeral for humanism. Victor Erofeev, who compiled
an anthology of contemporary prose entitled Russia's Flowers of Evil,
rightly notes that in Soviet times, both official and dissident literature
"shared a root system" of hyper-moral values,57 but for some reason fails
to notice that his precious "evil flowers," gathered from the fields of
contemporary literature, share this same root system with nineteenthcentury Russian literature. Moreover, the anti-moralism which links many
of the writers in Russia's Flowers of Evil is nothing more than the
continuation of that same hyper-moralism (that is, the inveterate extreme
written into the "hyper" prefix itself), and thus passes easily into its own
opposite, as in hypertonia and hypotonia, hyperbole and litotes, praise
and mockery. After all, any hyperbole (for example, "it is a rare bird that
can make it halfway across the Dniepr" [Gogol]), is also a litotes: what
kind of bird is this, if it can't even make it halfway across the Dniepr?
Probably not an eagle or a hawk. . . . The hyperbole of the river turns into
the litotes of the bird. Thus, Russian literature's moral excess rendered it
simultaneously pliant and vulnerable to toxicity.
The main point omitted in Erofeev's formula about "Russia's flowers of
evil," about the new, openly negative Russian literature, which supposedly
opposes both the "benevolent" classical and the pseudo-benevolent Soviet
literatures, is that the poles of good and evil had always come together in
Russian literature and continue to do so, remarkably without becoming
isolated from each other, but creating linguistic catastrophes, short
circuits: flashes of light alternating with sudden darkness. Who are
Sorokin and Erofeev to teach Dostoyevsky and Gogol, Pushkin and
Lermontov, about evil? The Party Secretary munching on his own or
someone else's excrement (a typical character in Sorokin's short stories)
is nothing but a malicious child compared to Svidrigailov, Stavrogin,
Iudushka Golovlev, Blok's and Mayakovsky's lyrical heroes, or even
Pushkin's Salieri and Don Juan. The former is an innocent evil, a wild
flower. Erofeev uses this 'wildflower' metaphor to juxtapose the literature
of evil with the literature of good: "Literature once smelled of wildflowers
and fresh hay, but now new smells arise, this stench. Everything stinks…

Faith and reason no longer count for anything; the role of unfortunate
accidents, of chance in general increases."58 As if Smerdiakov (literally
"Stinker") didn't stink in the nineteenth century, as if a stench didn't rise
up from Raskolnikov's Petersburg in the summer, as if the Underground
Man didn't negate faith and reason. Erofeev borrowed all of these
problems, and even all of the vocabulary, from that very "good old
Russian literature" that was overshadowed by the names of Gogol,
Dostoyevsky, Schedrin, Rozanov, and Blok. Erofeev uses this dualistic
model himself: "The pendulum swung away from lifeless, abstract
humanism, the hypermoralistic tilt was straightened. A bright page of evil
has been written into Russian literature."59 Note how consistently Erofeev
uses humanistic clichés in order to turn them inside-out. How many times
have we heard the words "a bright new heroic page has been written into
Russian literature (history, culture)"? Erofeev replaces heroics and
humanism with "evil" -- "a bright page of evil. . ." etc., still abiding by the
rules of dualistic transposition.
But such a juxtaposition of new and old literature, while quite adequately
contained within the perimeters of the "dualistic model," is unfair not only
toward Russian classical literature, which penetrates the depths of evil,
but also toward the new Russian literature, which simmers and despairs
along the very same dualistic model, because it knows and sees, if not
with its eyes then with the back of its head, in its bones, that somewhere
out there is a gaping chasm of light. I bring to bear the words of the
composer Alfred Schnitcke about Erofeev's stories, those plucked evil
flowers: "You immediately experience that double effect of encountering
something long familiar, yet absolutely unprecedented, that shock of
seeing hell and heaven simultaneously, which is happening within all of
us… You are not sure of what has left you breathless — your indignation at
the profane subjects and characters or the charged, hushed atmosphere,
with its keenly perceptible martyr-like holiness ."60
These words about the meeting of heaven and hell are a splendid formula
not only for the new Russian literature, but also for the deep-laid model of
all Russian culture. Centuries after centuries passed, but purgatory never
appeared. Contemporary literature is based on that very blasphemy which
is impossible without the experience or precondition of sanctity. Venedict
and Victor Erofeev, Sorokin and Nabrikova, Mamleev and Prigov all
blaspheme—and their blasphemies flow unimpeded into the Russian
cultural tradition; they cannot oppose it, because the culture itself is
characterized by the opposition of sanctity and blasphemy. Blasphemy
and sacreligious acts have been committed in Russia since time
immemorial because people knew where to find the sacred, and how to

use it. One can only blaspheme in the temple or before it, acknowledging
the sanctity of that which is being blasphemed.
Even such a "super-irresponsible"61 director of Soviet culture as comrade
A. A. Zhdanov understood this dual code when he chose two authors for
ideological censure in 1946 -- Akhmatova and Zoschenko, the so-called
aristocratic apex and democratic nadir of Russian letters, the erudite and
the inarticulate. To have chosen these two specifically Zhdanov had to
make a mental effort, if not exactly equal to Merezhkovsky's "Tolstoy and
Dostoyevsky" then at least utilizing the same dualistic models of Russian
culture. He even picked an appropriately expressive quote from
Akhmatova:
But I swear by the garden of angels
I swear by the icon of miracles
And the heat of our fiery nights. . .
"Anno Domini"
The miracle-working icon and fiery fumes, Eden and the hyena, angel and
beast... and in the middle, "the raging lady" who, according to Zhdanov
(then again, plagiarized from Eichenbaum) "tearing back and forth from
the boudoir to the chapel."62 So all of Russian literature races back and
forth between "the angel and the beast," between "Anno Domini" and "A
Monkey's Adventures" (the double objects of Zhdanov 's censure).
"Neither a nun nor a whore, but rather a whore and a nun, whose lechery
is interspersed with prayer" -- after all, this could be said not only of
Akhmatova, but to an even greater extent about Tsvetaeva, Blok,
Mayakovsky...
What if a poet appeared in Russia who neither blasphemed nor prayed,
who did not tear about madly between the boudoir and the chapel, who
did not succumb to dark despair, cynical indifference, or religious rapture,
but who quietly rejoiced and quietly sorrowed for life's quiet events -would this be a totally social writer? He would simply never be noticed, or
would be disparaged much as Alexander Kushner was disparaged -- an
incredibly gifted writer who happened to be inclined toward the middle
zone. Such a poet has no code of signs and symbols in Russian culture. As
Andrei Ariev so rightly remarked, "Kushner is the Laodician angel of
contemporary Russian poetry, that very one from 'The Confessions of John
the Theologian': 'I know your ways; you are neither hot nor cold; o, would
that you were hot or cold!' He is the one we've been missing. . . . He is
warm. It is the rarest case of poetic inspiration at 98.6 degrees."63 But
for this precise reason Russian criticism "vomits up" a great

lukewarm/middling poet whom it needs so much. There can be no
leisurely promenade along the razor's edge; one must side either with
Sodom or with the Madonna or, even better, split into bloody halves, exist
on both sides at once, but never rest in the middle. Yet Kushner, in fact,
loves this middle. "I don't like his hell or his heaven," he says about
Dante, giving us to understand with the entire context of his poem "A
Conversation in the Foyer" that he enjoys the chatter and arguments in
the foyer far more than the expanses of other worlds. Purgatory is never
mentioned -- it is probably the very thing replaced by the foyer.
From Kushner's restrained yet tortured writings, in which he makes so
many attempts to establish the middle measure of Russian poetry, to
reduce it to Viazemsky, Baratynsky, or Innokentii Annensky, it is evident
that he is well aware of the dire straits in which he is caught.64 Russia is
enmeshed between Blok and Mayakovsky, who in all their polarity are
themselves split between the sacred and the profane, so that both enact
in their poetry something like a black mass. The demonic is merely that
confluence of Sodom and the Madonna which allows for no middle ground,
when the worship of one turns into worship of the other. The heroine of
Blok's poetry, the "stranger," is in fact the Madonna of Sodom, just as
Mayakovsky's lyrical hero is Sodom 's Christ; martyred, suffering,
crucified, but a servant of Sodom .
The same occurs in philosophy. Between such heights of Russian thought
as the prayerful (yet also blasphemous in his own way) Vladimir Soloviev
and the profane (yet somehow pious) Vasilii Rozanov, no one notices the
level plateaus of neo-Kantian or neo-Leibnitzian thought, some Aleksei
Kozlov or Nikolai Korkunov. Russian positivists such as Chernyshevsky or
Pisariev arouse interest only because they were Russia 's nihilists as well.
Both Belinsky and Gogol are, in their own way, demonic. Neither wants to
acknowledge a boundary between the church and the world: Gogol
represents the demonism of the universal church, which would later be
expressed in Soloviev's theocracy and in Daniel Andreiev's "Roses of the
World" project; Belinksy represents the demonism of the pseudo-church,
which Lenin and Stalin subsequently elaborated with their party-ocracy.
All of this is demonic, not worldly. The whole point is that secularism's
opposite is not the sacred—these two actually complement each other —
but the demonic. Demonism is a hyper-tense relation of the poles, rather
than the creation of a neutral zone. Demonism is that cruel irony of a
positive action which is carried out with excessive force, pregnant with the
seeds of destruction. The spirit of negation, Mephistopheles, is not
demonic; that is Faust, the spirit of creation, erecting a city in the swamp,

moving the bounds of the land to enable the sea to engulf it. "You yourself
prepare a splendid feast for Neptune , the sea-devil!" Mephistopheles tells
Faust, who is basking in his victory over the sea. Peter I served as the
likeliest prototype for Goethe's Faust (in Part II of the tragedy, where
Faust comes forward as a city-builder).65 In conversation with Eicherman
Goethe brings up Peter as an example of what he terms 'the
demonic.'66 Curiously, when Eicherman asks whether some demonic
qualities might not be attributable to Mephistopheles as well, Goethe
replies, "No, Mephistopheles is too negative; the demonic prevails only as
a totally positive, active force."67
How then does the demonic differ from the secular; why has Russian
culture, starting with Peter's time, become secularized only superficially,
while internally the process of demonization accelerated, beginning to be
actualized in part by Pushkin and Lermontov, whose work forms the
transition from the secular to the demonic? Secularism is neutral,
equidistant from both poles, while the demonic is a doubly charged,
positive energy, which becomes negative by means of "inversion and
rupture."
The construction of St. Petersburg in a swamp where waves from the Gulf
of Finland wash over it was a demonic deed. Cutting his path to the West,
hurrying to civilize Russia , Peter built its European capital in a Finnish
swamp.
Burning the second volume of Dead Souls was a demonic deed. In his
frenzy to clamber to the spiritual heights, Gogol lurched backward from
the ladder on which he had been standing, fell, and broke apart.
Herzen was wrong in saying that Russia responded to Peter's reforms with
the phenomenon of Pushkin. In fact, as a result of these reforms, the
demonic prevailed over the worldly and social in Russian culture, so that
the real response to Peter's deeds turned out to be the Gogol
phenomenon. And how could it be otherwise, when the demonic was now
contained in Peter's deeds and personality? The demonic is not antireligious at all; it is super-religious and quasi-religious. The demonic does
not entail blasphemy, but rather the worship of Caesar as God, or the
desire to worship God as Caesar, when the opposition of God and Caesar
turns into a symbol of their linkage and interchangeability.
The flooding of St. Petersburg and the burning of Dead Souls occur in the
same plane, just like the theocratic project mockingly worked out by Ivan
Karamazov for Russia and the subsequently serious one concluded by

Vladimir Soloviev and Daniel Andreiev (though these two had the
forbearance to acknowledge, at least partially, the demonic nature of
these projects68). The demonic entails the passage of one pole into the
other, when excessive positive energy turns into the terrible energy of
destruction and self-destruction, when man begins with the ideal of the
Madonna and ends up with the reality of Sodom; when a poet worships his
Beautiful Lady on bended knee and, not daring to touch her, finds solace
in the treacherous embrace of the Stranger; when a writer preaches love
for his fellow man so zealously that he forgets about his own loved ones,
and values the labor of peasants so highly that he is willing to sacrifice
every creation of the artistic spirit, including his own, on its altar; when a
Christian thinker surpasses Christ himself with the wide sweep and grand
promises of his sermons, proclaiming the physical resurrection of the dead
or the obliteration of Caesar's kingdom by the universal church.
I do not believe that it is possible to banish the demons from Russian
culture. Generally, in banishing its demons, a culture falls even deeper
into demonism; big demons flock to and engulf the small ones. The
demonism of Belinsky fell upon Gogol's, the demonism of autocracy was
attacked by the demonism of the Bolsheviks; Dmitri Karamazov's demons,
with their " Sodom and Madonna," fled before the far more terrifying
demons of Ivan Karamazov and Smerdiakov. Demons must exist
according to the definition of the state of the world, since it is written that
"the devils also believe, and tremble" (James 2:19 ). So let Russia 's
demons believe and tremble; nothing more is required of them.
In speaking of "the demonic," I refer to this concept in the descriptive, not
the judgmental sense. The demonic is just as legitimate and necessary a
cultural category as "the apophatic" or "the secular," and belongs in the
same conceptual sphere. Demonism should not be confused with
satanism—that is, open and conscious opposition to God. The demonic
might merge with the satanic, as in Mayakovsky's work, or it might
oppose it, as in Gogol's. Unlike the word "Satan," the word "demon"
comes not from the Hebrew but from Greek mythology (the Latin
equivalent is "genius"). Aleksei Losev defines the demonic as "a
generalized conception of some undefined and formless divine power, evil
or (rarely) benevolent, frequently determining man's fate in life. This
terrible fatal force appears and disappears in a moment; it cannot be
named, no relationship can be established with it. Like a sudden wave, it
acts with lightning speed and immediately vanishes without a trace.
Evident in this image are elements of so-called sudden pre-animism (to
use G. Uzner's terminology, a demon is nothing more than a 'god of the
given moment')."69Significantly, the demonic lacks a monosemantic

moral slant; it can be benevolent (there is even the epithet "devilishly
happy") or, more often, malevolent. The point is, however, that it lies
beyond good and evil -- not in the neutral, but in its opposite, extreme
zone of greatest tension, where a single moment proves as weighty as a
sharp turn of fate. The demon is just that — the god of the moment. It is
no accident that Dostoyevsky, the most demonic (and anti-satanic) of
Russian writers, has such a penchant for that little word "suddenly," like
fine beadwork woven through the cloth of his narrative. The demonic spirit
is one of inversion and rupture, as opposed to drawn out, gradual
evolution. That is why Kierkegaard insisted: "the demonic is sudden."70
The Apophatic
Another component of Russian culture is apophatism, a negative theology
and aesthetic whose highest ideal can be presented only as a denial, a
step back, as something unattainable. According to the founder of
apophatic theology, Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagit (5 th-6 th century, c.e.),
since the divine exceeds human understanding and there are no accurate
means to know and to describe God, it is more precise to describe not
what God is, but what he isn't. God is not truth, reason, light, goodness,
etc.; he is not the pinnacle of all we know and say. Therefore it is better
either to keep silent about God altogether, or if speaking of him, to choose
comparisons that are most blatantly incompatible with God. For example,
in some sense it is more correct to speak of God's insanity than of his
reason, because it is easier to confuse God with reason than with insanity.
The lower the comparison, the less danger of substitution. "So it is that
scriptural writings, far from demeaning the ranks of heaven, actually pay
them honor by describing them with dissimilar shapes so completely at
variance with what they really are that we come to discover how those
ranks, so far removed from us, transcend all materiality. Furthermore, I
doubt than anyone would refuse to acknowledge that incongruities are
more suitable for lifting our minds up into the domain of the spiritual than
similarities are."71 For instance, God is compared to a sweet-smelling
ointment or a sharp-edged stone or a lion or a panther; the lowliest, most
inappropriate -- and hence the most pious -- comparison is of the Messiah
to a worm in the messianic psalm: "But I am a worm, and no man; a
reproach of men, and despised of the people." (Psalms 22:6). This
negative theology was actually inspired not only by Pseudo-Dionysius's
teaching, but by the example of Christ himself, the "heavenly king"
appearing in a "beggar's guise," as well as by the example of his parables,
where the greatest is likened to the lowliest (for instance, the kingdom of
God and the mustard seed).

Russia 's spiritual tradition is marked by the prevailing influence of
apophatism not just in theory: the central figure of saintliness in Russia is
the yurodieviy (a wandering holy fool), in whom filth, rough speech,
obscenities, disgraceful behavior and appearance serve God's purpose
with "befitting incongruity." It is not surprising, then, that Russian
literature, particularly from Gogol onward, started to use the apophatic
method to express the "artistic ideal" through distinctly incongruous
imagery. It makes sense that Gogol's work became the first (in fact, so
far, the only) object for the study of Russian artistic apophatism.
The first precedent of which I know for this kind of approach to Russian
material is Robert A. Maguire's article about Gogol's stylistic interpretation
of apophatic theology, particularly in the negative syntax of descriptions
and metaphors, when an object is characterized by the denial of its
indicators and the very possibility of describing it. Maguire also relates
Gogol's creative impotence during the last decade of his life, the burning
of the second volume ofDead Souls and the author's subsequent ascetic
self-mortification to the Pseudo-Dionysian aesthetic of progressive silence,
when speech itself "arises to extinguish speech."72
Gogol's lesson, as the American scholar reminds us, is certainly important
for the entire subsequent history of artistic apophatism in Russia , since
that history largely incorporated Gogol's characteristic techniques of
negative imagery, silence about the important things, and expression of
the secondary. To this I must add that "deadness," that universal quality
of Gogol's world, can also be seen as a sort of apophatic image, directing
us toward true life and greatness of the spirit beyond the bounds of the
expressible. If God is neither light nor spirit, then an adequate
representation may be the gloom and soullessness which reign in all of the
mature Gogol's imagery. The writer creates an aura of "godly shade"
around every object to suggest the possibility of its godly enlightenment,
which simply does not lend itself to description, and lies outside the
author's own power. A beauty "untold and indescribable," to use the
apophatic expression of Russian folklore. This is especially relevant to
such a religious subject as Russia was in Gogol's eyes. If in the first
volume of Dead Souls he undertakes an apophatic description of Russia
based on visible, inert indications which do not correspond to its true
poetic essence, then in the second volume he tries to approach this
elevated subject catophatically (positively), picturing Russia in terms of
positive images—"light," "wisdom," "grandeur"; here he met with failure.
After Gogol, apophatism became the prevalent tendency in Russia 's
artistic culture, forming a distinct aesthetic structure for "critical realism."

According to this structure, which Belinsky formulated specifically on the
basis of Gogol's works, Russian reality has no events, faces, or characters
which might be artistically rendered as positive images. The artist sins
against truth if he creates ideal characters. This does not mean that the
artist should lack an ideal—but that ideal can be convincingly expressed
only by criticizing anything that falls short of the ideal, in a negative
approach to reality. The time for idealistic poetry is past. Realistic poetry
does not openly present an ideal; it only suggests it, secretly and
indirectly, while mercilessly exposing anything that pretends to embody
that ideal. The entire theory of the naturalist school and critical realism
rests on an apophatic foundation, a negative conception of the ideal which
is "neither this, nor this, nor that" (this negation includes all strata of
society, all types of worldviews; and those writers who dared to retreat
from negativism and create "ideal" images, such as Dostoyevsky or Fet,
were forced to justify themselves in the face of accusations of reaction
and the idealization of vile reality). The charms of this critical theory,
intuitively buttressed by centuries of Eastern apophatism, were so great
that only Symbolism in the beginning of the twentieth century dared to
challenge it openly and, using the spiritual legacy of the WesternEuropean middle ages, affirm a different aesthetic principle of a positivelyvisualized ideal.
The apophatic aesthetic tradition extends to the present day; it is evident
in the prose of Yuz Aleshkovsky, Sasha Sokolov, Venedict Erofeev, Victor
Pelevin, Vladimir Sorokin, and in the poetry of Joseph Brodsky and the
conceptualists. Thus, in Erofeev's prose-poem "Moscow-Petushki"
Venichka (the author/narrator) can find no better evidence for the
existence of God than "the hiccups," which strike and abate so suddenly.
"The law is above all of us. The hiccups supersede any law. . . . We are
trembling creatures, but they are omnipotent. They -- that is, God's right
hand, which is raised over all of us. . . . He is inaccessible to the mind,
consequently He exists. And so, be perfect, as is your Heavenly
Father."73 This "sixth" proof of God's existence -- the hiccups -- might
seem profane or at best a humorous parody, but it reveals the apophatic
spirit of Russia's new religiosity in the same way as did the eccentric,
"blaspheming" behavior of the Russian yurodieviyi. There is the same logic
of a negative knowing of God -- through something that renders human
will and reason powerless, such as the hiccups, a series of involuntary
spasms at arbitrary intervals of time. Comparing God to the hiccups is just
as much a "befitting incongruity" as comparing the Messiah to a worm.
This is why Erofeev says (as though quoting from a tract on apophatic
theology) "He is inaccessible to the mind, hence He exists."

Like demonism, the apophatic is a leap, an inversion, not only in the realm
of literature but also in the artist's life, and in its socio-mythological
interpretation. It turns out that Venichka Erofeev -- both as author and as
protagonist -- drinks and carouses not for pleasure, but as punishment. It
is his cross, and he compares his drunkenness to St. Theresa's stigmata.
Venichka's friends (the philologist Vladimir Muraviev, the poet Olga
Sedakova) share this interpretation of his "heroic feat": the intoxication
which costs Venichka his voice and then kills him was some sort of
schema, almost voluntarily undertaken. The same mournful and elevated
public perception applies to Vladimir Vysotsky's self-destructive
beginnings, both in life and artistically. All of this is evidence of the
Russian tendency to skip over the middle, human level and to connect
directly the sacred and the bestial. Everything animal, undiluted,
passionate, unrestrained, disordered, natural, immediately and
spontaneously begins to represent everything elevated, godly, wise,
supernatural: without complete rupture, but with some sort of tearing and
inversion. Animal-prophets and holy drunkards are revered in the work of
Esenin, Vysotsky, and Erofeev. The leap from the natural to the sacred,
bypassing the cultural, which is crowded out and denounced from both
sides as insufficiently natural and as an obstacle to the supernatural. It
was thus in Tolstoy's simplification as well: a belching peasant, with his
"reckon"'s and "ain't"'s, embodies more wisdom and divine truth than
Shakespeare and Beethoven. Tolstoy does this seriously, Erofeev
ironically, yet in both cases lowly, natural bodies are the preferable
metaphors for the divine because they are not so easily confused with it,
and to "conceal the truth from the unenlightened" (Pseudo-Dionysius).
Why does Christ find evidence of the heavenly kingdom in the most
humdrum things, such as the mustard seed? Why is his first miracle the
turning of water into wine, temperance to intoxication, thereby comparing
the heavenly kingdom to a wedding feast, the union of bride and
bridegroom?
But in negative theology this comparison undersscores the absolute
incongruity of the earthly and the divine, while Russian apophatism would
perceive a catastrophic proximity, two disparate levels sticking together, a
small rip instead of a rupture, when insufficiency becomes excess, when
the not-quite-human is passed off as superhuman. A worker or a peasant
is taken for the savior of mankind, a criminal for a saint. This resembles
those sects, particularly the Khlysti (literally "whips"), that achieved
purification through its opposite -- riotous behavior, intemperance, the
pleasures of the flesh; by giving the erthly back to the earth in full, these
excesses somehow raised man up above the earth, unburdened, empty,
free, and open to accept the higher power. Stavrogin, having exhausted

himself with permissiveness and debauchery, seeks out the saintly Tikhon
and can achieve, in Tikhon's perception, even greater saintliness. That is,
the key to saintliness is sin, unrestrained immersion in sin and the curing
of like with like, the eradication of a sinful nature through
themultiplication of sins. Hence the blindly drunk Venichka's conversation
with the angels -- for they are also sacred creatures who fly down to a
debased creature, their brother. Truly, here is Askoldov's "angel-beast."
Of course, the creatures called angels in "Moscow-Petushki" act coldly and
mercilessly, and deliver the hero into the hands of his killers; that is, they
are probably "fallen" angels, whose voices are therefore the only ones
Venichka can distinguish.
Brodsky's apophatic poetry deserves particular mention. In it, the
compression of physical details serves rather to subtract than to add them
to the picture of the world, which is consequently emptied and voided and
placed in an elegant oval frame. Brodsky actually calls his muse "the muse
of deduction with no remainder," "the muse of zero" ("Lithuanian
Nocturne: to Thomas Wentslow"). His poetic attention focuses specifically
on those things that cancel themselves out, thus allowing one to imagine
nonexistence itself. Such is the butterfly, for example, in one of Brodsky's
best poems.
You are better than Nothing.
Rather, you are nearer
And more visible.
"The Butterfly"
Brodsky's most vivid and memorable metaphors generally contain some
sort of perceptible deduction, a dent or a gaping crater. Decaying teeth in
the mouth are cleaner than the ruins of the Parthenon… A bird, having lost
its nest, lays an egg in an empty basketball hoop.
A passerby with a crumpled
Face, is in the dark like
A ring removed from a finger. . .
"The Lagoon"
. . .when the book was slammed shut
and nothing was left of you but your lips, like that cat.
"New Stanzas for Augusta "

Generally, the machine of poetic reduction is constantly at work in
Brodsky's poetry. Thus time is subtracted from man -- only words are left.
Subtracting the greater from the lesser, Time from a man,
Only words remain…
"In England "
From all of man, you are left with a part
Of speech. A part of speech in general. A part of speech.
"…at the Russian word 'imminent'. . ."
Or, on the contrary, man is subtracted from language.
…peering at the inscriptions
of personal names, in a place where we are not: a place
where the sum depends on subtraction.
"Frozen syrupy shore. Hiding in the milk. . ."
In space, in time, and in manes Brodsky uncovers a kind of loss and
absence, completes the deductive process, and is left with a remainder of
zero or even something less than zero (his book of essays is entitled Less
Than One). Any sum in Brodsky's poems "depends on subtraction" -- it is
a sum of differences, a sum of remainders, which when added result in an
opposite, negative value.
"The people who have forgotten me could make up a city.
I entered the cage in place of the wild beast. . ." 74
Brodsky's poetry is like Platonism turned inside out; his world consists of
minus-ideas, negative essences. His city-state is made up of people who
have forgotten the poet—a sort of ideal community based on a negtive
indicator. Of cousre, Brodsky's apophatism directly contrasts religious
apophatism, which uses negation in order to approach the positive pole of
being. In Brodsky's work, on the other hand, the meticulous registry of
details serves to deduct them from existence and to present graphically,
as the ultimate reality, nonexistence itself. In "A Lullaby for the
Promontory at Tver" Brodsky writes of his love for the long things in life.
The ocean is longer than the earth, a string of days is longer than the
ocean, but "the thought of nothing" is a hunderd times longer than
everything else. Length is a space from which all measurements but one

have been deducted; reduced even further, it gives way to nothingness,
which is longer than anthing else precisely because it no longer even has
length, not even a single dimension. Nothingness is final; all else is
practice deduction in relation to it.
I have already written at length a about the apophatic qualities of
conceptualist art, particularly that of Kabakov, Prigov, and Rubenstein, so
there is no need to cover the same ground here.75 Nor is there any
further need to prove the apophatism of such classical figures in
twentieth-century Russian literature as Andrei Platonov and the Oberiut
writers. In Platonov's writing all the human figures can barely conceal the
world's melancholy emptiness, which serves as some sort of vasgue
negative to what might be called "Platonov's ideal" in the spirit of the
realist aesthetic; its positive definitions might range from Marx's
communism to Fiodorov's immortality to the Buddhist nirvana. Yakov
Druskin, the Oberiuts's representative in the field of philosophy, is one of
the most oopenly apophatic Russian thinkers; moreover, like Kharms, he
is a religious thinker who consciously chose the apophatic path. Neither,
incidentally, has a demonistic bent, an affirmative peacemaking zeal; they
are conscious believers, though despairing of ever finding a "way across,"
a positive framework for their faith.
The Demonic/Apophatic
How does Russian cultural apophatism relate to its demonism? These are,
essentially, the two main components of Russian culture, the two
embodiments of its polarity. Demonism embodies positive energy which,
pushed to its limit and beyond, becomes its own opposite—destructive and
self-destructive action. Such were the lives of Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol,
Blok, Esenin, Mayakovsky, Tsvetaeva, and more recently, Vysotsky,
Erofeev, and Brodsky. Apophatism embodies negative energy which,
having reached its limit by exposing the worthlessness, emptiness, and
pointlessness of material life, directs one to the greater realms of silence,
inaccessible to sight and hearing.
Thus apophatism and demonism set themselves in opposition to social art,
which is constructed along catophatic (affirmative) lines, in which some
spiritual or ideal content is expressed in a corresponding form and
everything is structured around a "proper likeness." Within this affirmative
realm, resembling the relation between form and sirit, expression and
embodiment, are the two main categories of European culture, as defined
by Nietzsche: the Dionysian and the Apollonian, musical pressure and
sculptural completion. These are the two kinds of positive aesthetics which

move between the poles of the excessive and the commensurate, the
elevated and the beautiful, spontanaiety and rhythm. But neither the
Dionysian nor the Apollonian has that characteristic Russian quality—
inversion, rupture, substitution.
Demonism and apophatism share that "middle" realm which, in secular
culture, is aligned between its positive and negative poles. The demonic is
the passage from positive to negative, bypassing the middle. Apophatism
is the passage from negative to positive, bypassing the middle. Demonism
and apophatism form a kind of ring of permutations and passages
between extreme poles—a ring made up of "inversions" and "weird
flourishes," spinning around an empty center.
This is why demonism and apophatism often complement each other in
the work of the same author. For instance, in Gogol one frequently finds
both types of polar linkage. When Gogol creates images of pettiness,
vacuity, and worthlessness, one senses behind them the presence of some
positive pole. Akakii Akakovich, for example, has an apophatic existence,
s though turned inside-out. The character is a humble man who,
unbeknownst to others, leads the life of a spiritual ascetic, a serene
copyist immersed in a world of pure signs and wanting nothing to do with
the physicality and materialism of the world—and it is this that, ultimately,
seduces and destroys him. Wherever Gogol minimizes, creating the image
of a humble man, he also sketches an invisible figure of exaggeration, a
figure of saintliness. And contrarily, when Gogol begins seriously, at the
height of his artistic zeal, to elevate something, he discovers the demonic
qualities of his gift—as, for example, in the lyrical image of Russia , built
upon the same rinciples as his images of evil spirits, witches, and
sorcerers ("everything inside you turned its unblinking eyes on
me").76 Like Chartkov, the artist in the tale of "The Portrait," whenever
Gogol tries to draw saints' faces, he finds devilish features winking out at
him. Is it not Gogol himself who, having decided to portray Russia and its
incalculable richness of spirit—"a man gifted with divine goodness" or "a
marvellous Russian girl" (Dead Souls) — suddenly "saw with horror that
he had given almost every figure the eyes of a usurer. They looked out at
him so demonically and seductively that he shuddered in spite of himself"
("The Portrait").77 The positive energy ofGogol the artist acquires a
demonic cast, while the negative grows apophatic. But in both cases we
are dealing with the orbit of poles around a gaping, empty center.
The demonic and the apophatic have a different combination in brodsky's
poetry. First of all we find a demonism of language, which uses man as its
instrument. Brodsky has voiced many opinions on this theme; one need

look no further than one of his Nobel Prize speeches: "No one knows
better than a poet that what we commonly call the voice of the Muse is
actually the dictate of language; that language is not his instrument, but
he is the means by which language propagates its own existence. . . . Man
. . . becomes dependent upon this process (writing poetry) in the same
way that he becomes dependent upon drugs or alcohol. A man addicted to
language in this way is, I suppose, what is called a poet."78 This is
Brodsky's fundamental aesthetic and ethical credo: a poet is the
instrument of language. Yet such a relation between the speaker and his
language turns out to be a source of demonism. The apostle James writes:
"Quote" (James 3:5-8). Brodsky's apophatism flows out of this possession
by languge, sine language, being everything, presents everything outside
itself as nothing, and anything that gets caught in language, that is
named by language, becomes deducted from existence, leaving behind a
gaping hole. Adam was given language so that he might name the things
around him; for Brodsky, language names things and robs them of
existence, turning them into "things of language."
The air is a thing of language. . .
That is why it's pure.
Nothing in the world is more irreproachable
(except for death itself)
than white pages.
The whiter, the less human.
Man leaves nothing behind but his spoken words; things leave nothing but
their names. But in the end, even the names are gone, and only air
remains -- "the things of language." By making language the instrument
of his demonic power over the world, the poet apophatically objectifies
this world, turning it into symbols of nothingness. The fullness of language
is the emptiness of the world, and therefore equals the purity of air and of
death.
If the overwhelming majority today values Brodsky much more than
Kushner, despite the relative commensurability of their poetic worlds
(harkening back to St. Petersburg neo-classicism), it is partially because
Brodsky is a demonic figure, in some sense even an apophatic one, while
Kushner is a purely social figure, and thus, according to the rules of
Russia's artistic code, "pettyish." Both in his poetry and in his essays,
Kushner consciously defends life on a moderate material/spiritual scale,
but in order for the "soft screams" to be heard, Russia 's artistic culture
must change its code, must switch to a ternary, or at least a medial one.
Incidentally, Pasternak managed to arouse interest in that same quiet flow

of daily life to which Kushner tried to call attention; the result, however,
became two polar movements crossing the central zone in two opposite
directions. First he fell into unprecedented complexity, then veered
abruptly into unprecedented simplicity, which had the virtue of being
"heretical"; that is, among the sacred traditions of theRussian avantgarde, it was perceived as Pasternak's "profanation of self," as his
sacreligious challenge to those very shrines which he had once upheld.
This "unprecedented simplicity" merged easily into the binary code of
Russian culture which, in Berdiaev's words, categorizes all thought as
orthodoxy or heresy.
Generally, Pasternak loathed the "middle" aesthetic and made every
attempt to avoid it, even risking blatant tastelessness -- a principle
consciously espoused in Doctor Zhivago. "Gordon and Dudorov… did not
know that the plight of average taste was worse than the plight of
tastelessness."79 In twentieth century Russia one finds many writers
embodying various means of "rupturing the center." For instance, Gorky,
Mayakovsky, Blok, and Tsvetaeva were all artists of a demonic cast, while
the Oberiuts and conceptualists were mainly apophatic. Khlebnikov and
Platonov have at times combined the demonic and the apophatic, while
Nabokov and Brodsky could mix in the secular as well. Perhaps it is
hardest to find a strictly secular writer in twentieth-century literature — if
you think about it, the main contender for this title would be Alexander
Solzhenitsyn, precisely because he is a secular-religious writer. In this
sense he most closely resembles the eighteenth century, when religion
and worldliness were easily combined without falling into contradiction.
One can distinguish neither the demonic nor the apophatic behind the
common sense and common faith in Solzhenitsyn's writing.80
To classify writers according to these four indicators—religion, secularity,
demonism, and apophatism—is tricky. In general, studies of these two
coordinates -- "authors" and "tendencies" -- can only cross at certain
points, and never be wholly superimposed on each other.
Orthodoxy and Culture
What place, then, can Orthodoxy occupy in this burgeoning ternary model
of Russian culture, when its basic premise and precondition is duality?
In the context of the second secularization now beginning, the significance
of Konstantin Leontiev grows; he combined extreme conservatism, even
fundamentalism, in his religious views with a broad and even radical, quite
secular view of the blossoming diversity of cultures. There is no crude

contradiction between these poles of Leontiev's thought, but a complex
mutual supplementation, especially if we direct his thought toward
culture's postmodern condition, in which extreme, avant-garde
movements have been exhausted and everything else is becoming
increasingly mixed up. In this impulse toward the middle Leontiev sees
"the ideal and the means of world destruction" and contrasts it with the
colorful polarity of the Byzantine and Slavic traditions. "An aesthetic
of life… the poetry of reality is impossible without
this variety of positions and feelings which develops as the result of
inequality and strife. . . . Aesthetics saved my civility. . . . I began to love
the monarchy, began to love the military and the soldiers, began
to pity and value the aristocracy . . . even to defend Orthodoxy, of which,
I am ashamed to say, I understood absolutely nothing at the time, but
only loved it with my heart and my imagination."81 As the site of the
world's greatest diversity culture cannot fail to view religion as the site of
greatest remove from the world, as an alternative to the world. Without
its religious component, secular culture loses the radical "other" which
lends it its colorful polymorphousness.
In the dual structure of Russian culture, the Orthodox Church occupies a
firm, definite place because in many ways it formulated and
predetermined this dualism, the sharp distinction between the things of
this world and of the next. Western Christianity, both Catholic and
Protestant, differs in its long history of activism, directing the social,
moral, scientific, and professional life of its congregation outside of the
church. At the same time the church concerned itself with many of the
world's needs and affairs, changing in letter and in spirit, adapting to
historical changes, imbibing the spirit of the times, responding to the
needs of society. Hence the neutralization, the formation of a watery
middle zone between the church and the world. In Eastern Christianity the
church remains much more aloof from the world and allows the world to
stay aloof from it; it surrounds itself with high walls and cherishes the
monastic spirit and the immutability of doctrine inside this fortress. The
Orthodox Church did not actively shape the world, and so remained
politically helpless, dependent on worldly powers. Yet it also retained
dualistic tension in its relation to the world. The Orthodox Church remains
alien, radically "other" in relation to the world, and maintains that
powerful tension and polarity in culture which has disappeared in the
Catholic and Protestant worlds. In this sense, due to its essential
traditionalism, its lagging behind the times, its position outside of social
culture, the Russian Orthodox Church can mark a most important moment
in cultural diversification.

Ivan Kireievsky remarks that "this untouchability of the limits of divine
revelation, vouching for the purity and firmness of faith in the Orthodox
Church, on the one hand protects its teachings from the misguided
interpretations of natural reason, and on the other hand protects reason
from the misguided meddling of the Church's authority. This is why an
Orthodox Christian will always question equally, how Galileo could be
burned at the stake for his disagreement with the opinions of the Church
hierarchy, and how one can deny the veracity of the apostolic missives
because of a disparity between their truth and the opinions of some man
or of some time."82 And although Kireievsky insists in the very next
sentence upon "quote," his previous discussion points up precisely the
duality of faith and reason underlying Russian culture, while the Western
churches are, on the contrary, directed toward monism, toward the union
of faith and reason; on the one hand this results in scientific criticism of
the Scriptures and on the other, the church's persecution of scientific
thought. A series of accords and compromises between faith and reason in
the West has established a neutral middle ground in which the tension of
values has been weakened.
The presence of the Orthodox Church always lends something alien and
otherworldly to society, something not quite comprehensible and difficult
to accept, some sort of irrational or other-rational residue which cannot be
dissolved in ideas of freedom, equality, expediency, humanity, or purpose.
In this way, society is guaranteed a certain minimal diversity, an inner
heterodoxy, without which even the freest society can succumb entirely to
the neutral zone, lose that otherworldliness that stands fast inside the
world, or at least on its edges. Culture must have such a firm,
multicultural education if not to fulfill religious needs then at least for the
sake of the purely cultural and even aesthetic ones.
Despite all this the threshold between the Orthodox Church and the world
is so steep that it is difficult for culture to cling to it, to maintain its
balance. Within the very core of Russian culture lies the idea that it might
not have existed and perhaps should not exist now, the idea of self-denial.
The Russian intelligentsia lacks spontanaiety—it is no wonder that it
appeared as an "intelligentsia," that is, a self-reflective, self-created
beginning. Russian culture constantly questions its right to exist: either it
denies itself in thereligious sense, taking cover under the aegis of temples
(either canonical or heretical), or it denies religion itself, seeing judgment
in its countenance. Russian culture exists in a deep existential cellar, and
it shares all the underground man's complexes and neuroses—a hysterical
mixture of pride and self-abnegation. This is a culture of the catacombs,
still unsure of itself even when the state supports it with all its might.

Even the state, "Caesar," has religious justification in the Orthodox world,
while culture has none.
In the dual model of the "sacred/sinful," the sinner is more justified than
the un-sinning, un-saintly man. Culture -- the earthly analogue of
purgatory -- is a battleground on which heaven and hell close in on each
other in earnest. In "Art by the Light of Conscience" Tsvetaeva writes:
"(Art) is the third kingdom with its own laws, from which we so rarely
manage to escape into a higher realm (and how frequently, into the
lower!)… Art is a purgatory between the heaven of the spirit and the hell
of birth into this earthly life, yet no one wants to leave it for 'salvation.'"
As a Russian artist, Tsvetaeva saw art as the "third kingdom" -- therefore
even more seductive, more sinful than any ordinary sin. "Art -- artifice -is perhaps the ultimate temptation on this earth, the keenest, the one
which is impossible to withstand." 83
Russian culture is beseiged; the threat stems from the culture itself, from
its radical self-doubt. No one blames Russian literature for all the evils and
pitfalls of Russian history except the critics and writers themselves. They
blame their profession for the sins of revolution and totalitarianism, which
literature supposedly nourished with its poisonous criticism of Russian
reality and its destructive longing for the golden age. Neither the workers,
nor the peasants, nor the police, but the intelligentsia itself proclaims the
need to put an end to the intelligentsia. Even at the beginning of the
twentieth century, political radicals and religious liberals agreed upon the
necessity of 'suicide,' that is, the end of the intelligentsia. There was
nothing else that Bolsheviks and Vekhovtsy, Marxists and idealists,
attacked so zealously as the intelligentsia -- either because it was not
social enough, too mystical, or because it was not spiritual enough, too
civic-minded. The churches of Gogol and Belinsky came together in their
goal to destroy that cultural middle-ground on which they might have
truly met; they agreed in their hatred for the lukewarm petty bourgeoisie,
agreed precisely upon those extreme opinions in which their differences
were so irreconcilable.
In general, concern over excessive "literocentrism" and the methods of its
elimination seem to be more significant aspects of contemporary Russian
self-consciousness than literocentrism itself. In the absence of social
interst in literature, literature takes to heart the saying "disparagement is
worse than pride." In the fight against literocentrism, literature rises to a
new level of egocentrism, a collectively pretentious self-flagellation which
sounds like self-praise. As in 'literature gnaws to death our way of life and
our history; the people rave deliriously about poetry and confuse building

blocks with Blok's poems. Aren't we too strong, if our literary ancestors—
the Belinskys and Tolstoys—toppled an entire government with a single
flap of their wings? They shattered the country—we'll shatter the
shatterers in turn -- the country should be grateful.'
Let me repeat: all these attacks on literocentrism are being made by
writers themselves; nothing of the sort is heard from the engineers, the
mathematicians, even from politicians. Literature hurts no one and even
helps some—not by being "armed to the teeth and beyond" but in the
sense of "song heals an ailing spirit." And only literature, having lost all
the government's attention, stubbornly claims to be the source of power
itself, that the pen is mightier than the sword. The same can be said of
the intelligentsia's attempts to debunk the intelligentsia, to lay all the
horrors of bolshevism at its doorstep. Western observers have been
known to assess this contemporary battle of literature and the
intelligentsia against themselves as an expression of "masochism," which
is supposedly a traditional quality of Russian society. But one might rather
view Russian society's habits in a healthier light, and think that this noisy
battle with literocentrism is but a cunning attempt on the part of Russia 's
rapacious literature to reestablish itself at the center of communal
attention.
However paradoxical it may seem, this constant cultural self-denial, its
fierce self-doubt or clever self-disparagement, has gained in Russia a
value which other, more confident cultures lack. Russian culture has no
spontanaiety; it knows that it exists only in spite of itself, and thus its
existence in the Orthodox sphere takes on simultaneously a demonic and
apophatic character.
Rozanov asks: What is culture from a Christian point of view? What would
Christ, who never wrote a word or laughed, have to say about elegant
literature, about a laughing Gogol? What could the apostle Peter possibly
say about astronomy, or Paul about the theatre? In Rozanov's opinion,
"neither Gogol, nor literature in general, as a game, mischief, smiles,
grace, as the flower of human existence, can be compatible with
that mono-flower, 'Sweet Jesus.'"84 And if Russia 's Orthodox society
attends the theatre, then this is an inversion—either a jolly demonic
challenge thrown down to faith, or a melancholy apophatic silence about
that same faith. Culture is antiquity's heir; this was organically
incorporated in the Christian West, but remained alien to the East.
Russian culture is ashamed that it is a culture; it struggles, trying to
overcome itself in this capacity—or else it attempts to launch its own
insolent and desperate counterattack. Hence Rozanov's attacks on

Christianity which, with its otherworldly sweetness, embittered the fruits
of this world. In reply to Merezhkovsky's lecture which attempted to prove
Gogol's compatibility with the Scriptures, Rozanov gave his own lecture
(1907) in which he asserted that Gogol was not compatible with Scripture,
that aesthetics were not compatible with Christianity, and that therefore
Christianity, as a religion of death, was itself doomed (this later became
the central theme in "The Apocalypse of Our Time" [1918]). Let us
remember that all of these lectures were given in a religious/philosophical
society, so the dualism of the sacred and the secular, and the attempt to
reconcile them, were already fundamental themes.
In the meantime, Rozanov answers his own question: "The beggar is
always more attractive than the rich man: even poets render beggars in
verse. Who has described the rich man? He is the subject of satire. Thus,
one of the world's great mysteries lies in the fact that suffering is ideally
and aesthetically superior to happiness — it is melancholy, dignified. /. . .
/ Is the entire world's burial in Christ not the most aesthetic phenomenon
of all, the highest pinnacle of beauty?"85 If one follows this logic, the
highest pinnacle of beauty in the world is not the burial, but the
resurrection of Christ and life in Christ. But even if one were to stop at the
burial, Rozanov's words clearly indicate that death in the world comprises
its greatest beauty, and that the reason for the greater, healthier
flowering of aesthetics in the Christian world (as opposed to the pagan) is
that Christian aesthetics are not limited by images of earthly flesh, but
can express the depletion and the overcoming of this flesh. The denial of a
sensual, sculptural, Greek type of beauty leads to the creation of a new,
more inclusive and contradictory type of beauty in Christianity.
Christianity strikes aesthetics three times: when God makes his son flesh;
when this flesh is crucified and dies for the sins of the world; and when
the flesh is restored in glory and transcendence. All three instances
embody a beauty which supersedes the Apollonian beauty of the Greek
world. What further proof of cultivation can Rozanov demand of
Christianity?
It is remarkable that right after his admission that Christianity was "the
highest pinnacle of beauty in the world," Rozanov seems to ignore the
answer he himself uncovers and gets carried away by the sheer scope of
his antitheses, pushing onward in his conviction of the incompatibility of
Christianity and aesthetics. "Gogol cannot be inlaid in the Scriptures; thus,
he cannot be inducted into Christianity either; he should simply be thrown
out. Not from an earthly point of view, but specifically from the monastic
one, like a sweet death in Christ. Gogol loved the world and tied us to it.
This postpones the end of the world"86, etc. The writer's thought is

immediately dulled and diminished by this attempt to condemn
Christianity in Gogol's name. Gogol's beauty, his "love for the world," has
nothing to do with the admiration of the flesh, yet it is a laughing and
crying beauty, pierced through with Christian grief and pity for the world.
If Gogol laughs at the world, then it is precisely because Christ himself
never laughed. For therein lies the difference between man and God-asman: the path to salvation is revealed to man but he cannot save himself.
Gogol's "laughter through tears" is born from this combination of necessity
and impossibility.
Sergei Averintsev recently stimulated discussion of this dilemma between
"laughter and Christianity" by entering his concept of the carnival into a
respectful debate with Bakhtin. Averintsev proves convincingly that
laughter is by far not always benevolent and liberating, but is at times a
tyrannical, satanic force. "All in all, Orthodox spirituality mistrusts laughter
far more than the Western faith… Gogol, who did not know how to
combine within himself a comic genius and a pious man, is a very Russian
case in point." But Averintsev simultaneously shows that Christianity
created its ethics and culture of laughter as a "charm against feebleness";
that is, at once an admission and an overcoming of feebleness by man,
"self-mockery, a destructive attachment to himself."87 Gogol insisted that
through his characters he mocks himself first, his own petrification and
insensitivity. Piety, if it remains human, without demonic pretension to the
status of God-as-man, is fully compatible with comic genius.
So even stern Orthodoxy has its own beauty nd meaning for culture;
perhaps the difficulty of establishing Russian aesthetics lay not in the
church's opposition but in the inseparability of church from beauty. In
fact, the Orthodox faith was adopted in Rus precisely for its beauty; that
is, Russian religion and aesthetics flow together from the source. In the
ancient Russian chronicle "Tales of Bygone Years," the impression made
upon Prince Vladimir's emissarires sent to seek the best faith was this:
"And we came unto the Greek land, and they brought us into the place
where they worship their God, and we did not know where we were, in
heaven or on earth: for there is not such a spectacle and beauty in all the
world, and we do not know how to speak of it. We know only that God
abides with the people there, and their ritual is better than in all the other
lands. We cannot forget this beauty, for every man, having tasted of the
sweet, will no longer take the bitter. . . ."88 The lavish services and
beautiful rituals precluded the separation of beauty from ritual for many
years, prevented the separation of two spheres, the aesthetic and the
religious. So even disregarding the Christian justification of culture, Rssin
culture itself cannot exist without the aesthetic justification of Christianity

as the "highest pinnacle of beauty in the world."
Admittedly, Russian literature of the religious period preceding Peter's
reign created nothing of world significance—nor, come to think of it, did
secular literature after Peter. The eighteenth and beginning of the
nineteenth centuries were historically important but aesthetically a dim
period for literature. The pinnacles were Pushkin and Lermontov, but they
mark the end of Russian literature's social period and presage the
demonic which, along with the apophatic, will prevail in Gogol's writing
and writing of the post-Gogol period. Pushkin was a bright flash before the
imminent eclipse of social literature. Only the post-secular, neo-religious
period, with its dualistic tension and the struggle between the worldly and
the religious gave rise to truly great and world-renowned literary
phenomena: Gogol, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy. The reign of Alexander III
during the 1880s and '90s marked a sort of secular renaisssance, but this
was the dullest, least expressive time in nineteenth-century literature. It
yielded only Chekhov, and even his most significant quality is an
apophatic depth which stands out only later, against the backdrop of
Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy; he seems to keep silent about the things they
said aloud, and appears to be hiding some other, more important,
unspeakable mystery.
Chekhov has Burkin, the teacher in "The Man in the Jewel Box," say this
about the Khokhlushki (Ukranian girls), who, "either weep or laugh, and
have no mood in between."89 But this phrase could just as easily pertain
to the Khokhlhimself, who, having become a great Russian writer, says of
his own work that it reveals "a laughter visible to the world through
invisible, secret tears." Laughter and tears -- half and half, with nothing in
between. But even the prophet Jeremiah, whose words "I will laugh at my
own bitterness" are etched on Gogol's tombstone,90 never seemed to
express "middling moods" either. Even Chekhov, who strove to render his
tales precisely in this "middling mood," the hushed tones of a gray day,
"early twilight," became meaningful in Russia only because he shaded this
middle ground with sorrow and mockery around its edges.
Much has been said already about the Orthodox Church's historical
inadequacies and weaknesses, but one must acknowledge that without
this tense duality between spirit and flesh, between church and the world,
without these dizzying turns and inversions, Russia's artistic culture would
not exist:there would be no Gogol with his "dead souls," no Dostoyevsky
with his "ideals of Sodom and the Madonna," no Tolstoy with his paganism
and asceticism, no Platonov with his dull and empty physical world. Even
in the marvellous, worldly work of Nabokov -- classics of American

literature—one suddenly stumbles across "gnosticism"; that is, the
concept that a world immersed in evil is actually illusory and could fall
apart under the influence of unseen powers, as in Invitation to a
Beheading or in the author's next direct assertion: ". . .This world is but a
shadow, a companion to true existence, and neither the buyers nor the
sellers believe in it deep down, especially in calm, reasonable
America."91 One should probably not seek the sources of Nabokov's
"gnosticism" in the works of the gnostics themselves -- they are more
likely to lie in a more familiar spiritual heritage, in the dual worlds of
Russian Orthodoxy, which do not allow for "real existence" and tensely
await its end. Nor would that dualistic phenomenon known as "Russian
religious philosophy," with its taut limits imposed upon reason and faith,
be possible without Orthodoxy. In Western culture the very expression
"religious philosophy" is associated with the middle ages, with Thomas
Aquinas, because in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries philosophy
and religion have existed separately, almost never touching; for a
philosopher, any suggestion of religious predeliction or theological intent
would be an insult to his professional honor. Moreover, even theology is
pulling further and further away from religion; the knowledge of God is
pulling away from faith in him. The majority of contemporary Western
philosoophers are non-believers -- not some sort of desperate nonbelievers thirsting to believe, but serene non-believers, worldly people
who study church history or holy Scripture as dispassionately as a
paleontologist studies the remains of fossilized organisms. Unlike Western
theology and philosophy, Russian religious philosophy is not pluralistic,
but dualistic. The difference between the two is not so much the number
of fundamental starting points (two or many) as the means of their
interrelation. Pluralism assumes separate, independent starting points
which are tolerant and even indifferent toward each other. Dualism, on
the other hand, presumes starting points which are passionately involved
with each other, which can neither merge nor totally separate. Without
Orthodoxy there would be no Soloviev, with his ideas of total unity and
God-in-man; no Merezhkovsky, possessed by the battle between Christ
and the antichrist; no Rozanov, with his incompatibility of God and the
world; no Berdiaev, with his sermons and his prophecy of that
compatibility.
Berdiaev is, of course, correct in his criticism: "Orthodoxy, particularly
Russian Orthodoxy, is not justified by culture; it has a nihilistic aspect
toward everything that man creates upon this earth."92 Yet such denial,
particularly such denial of one's self, is a crucial aspect of Russian culture,
introduced by Orthodoxy. The dying need the Orthodox Church more than
the living, the sick more than the well, the suffering more than the happy,

the ignorant more than the educated. It stands at the very edge of the
world and it cannot, will not participate in the affairs of culture. Yet this
firm stand outside of culture sets up the polarity of cultural space itself.
Orthodoxy contributed to the creation of Russia 's artistic culture not by
blessing or cursing it, but precisely by its non-participation, its
'outerness'93. Orthodoxy created that dualism between the worldly and
the otherworldly which set up the pressure behind all of Russia 's artistic
stirrings, behind its utopian quest to bring about the kingdom of God on
earth and the tragicomic awareness of the impossibility of this. Russian
culture should thank Orthodoxy for its abstention from the affairs of
culture.
The Second Secularization and the New Crossroad
Two essential models of Russian culture separate it from the West. One
model is developed in the conception of "total knowledge" and "the unity
of all," by thinkers from Kireievsky to Soloviev. Russian monism stands in
opposition to Western dualism -- the split between subject and object,
faith and knowledge, reason and the stirrings of the heart, etc. Kireievsky
asserts: ". . .There you have a split in spirit, in thought, in science… a split
between the moral and the heartfelt states of mind. . .; in Russia, on the
contrary, there is an essential drive toward a wholeness of inward and
outward being, the public and the private, the speculative and the
pragmatic, the artificial and the moral. . . . Division and wholeness,
rationality and reason will be the ultimate expressions of Western
European and ancient Russian erudition."94
The other model is Russian dualism, with its polarity contrasting that
Western monism which is characterized by mediation, neutrality,
bourgeois prosperity, and the appearance of contentment. This motif is
expressed most emphatically by Dostoyevsky, Leontiev, Herzen,
Merezhkovsky, etc. Berdiaev remarks that "Dostoyevsky revealed the
polarity of the Russian spirit to be its most profound quality. How the
Russian spirit differs in this from the monistic spirit of the Germans! When
a German probes the depths of his soul, he finds divinity, all polarities and
contradictions are eradicated. /. . . / The Russian is more contradictory
and antinomic than the Western man; he combines the Asiatic and the
European spirits, East and West."95
Thus in one coordinate system Russian culture is to the Western as one is
to two (wholeness vs. division), while in another Russian polarity contrasts
Western monism as two to one. Perhaps this is the point at which both
cultures are called upon to become ternary within themselves. Could this

not constitute a new perspective on the convergence of the two cultures:
one and two in Russian culture, two and one in the West, finally adding up
to three?
As I have already stated, the ternary model cannot be reduced either to
duality or to a median. Not only must purgatory appear between hell and
heaven, but that purgatory cannot remain a singular, isolated space in the
topography of the new world -- it cannot crowd out our conceptions of hell
and of heaven. Life in the neutral zone is dangerous because it leads one
to forget boundaries, dulling any feeling or awareness of them. It leads to
the end of eventful existence, for events always take place along
boundaries, crossing over them. Purgatory can be the most eventful place
in the world, a place of salvation, of crossing the boundary between hell
and heaven, but it can also become the most uneventful if it establishes
itself in place of boundaries as the only possible site of existence, where
all entrances and exits are either closed or seen as "false entrances and
false exits" (Jacques Derrida) in an endless, one-sided system of
differences. The third, "central" position is always dangerous because its
convenience can turn the middling zones into the only possible zone,
pushing the other two back into a realm of safe indifference. This is why it
is so important to retain a snese of boundaries, for only that sense can
uphold the center in its function as a true central zone, the third as the
third; only that sense can prevent he center from becoming a single
placid, endlessly flat and convenient abode for "stress-free" post-historical
existence. Such dangerous entropic processes are already at work in
Western culture, turning a third, intermediate space into a single central
one: mass and elite cultures, socialist and capitalist economies, left and
right-wing politics are mixing and evening out in a way that leaves no
room for duality. What was third now becomes both the first and the last.
In order to maintain its difficult, flickering, borderline existence the third
needs the other two -- although one should allow in advance for the risky
possibilities of their direct interrelation, bypassing the third: eclecticism,
grotesque, one-sided stubbornness, avant-gardism, fundamentalism… But
only when the two both have their own separate source of power and act
independently of the third can the third be a place of eventful existence
along the boundaries.
Despite his critique of Russia 's binary tendencies, Yuri Lotman understood
perfectly the dangers of a "ternary" structure of the Western type, which
easily rids itself of inner tensions and dualities and becomes medial. He
only hoped that Russia wold avoid this danger as long as possible and
could, for the time being, concern itself with overcoming its binary
tendencies and establishing a third zone. He writes: "Ethical maximalism

has become so rooted in the very foundations of Russian culture that one
likely will not speak of the 'danger' of asserting an absolute golden mean;
even less likely is the fear that resolving contradictions might halt the
processes of creative explosion."96Lotman puts the word "danger" in
quotes yet warns us at the same time that in Russia the very processes of
mediation might occur in bursts. "We even want to realize gradual
development by applying explosive technology. However, this is not the
result of anyone's lack of thought, but the harsh dictate of a historically
binary structure."97Russia perceives the ternary in a "dualistic" way, as
the opposition to binary culture, as the eradication of duality itself;
therefore the ternary might "suddenly," unexpectedly, explosively turn
into mediality, into a kingdom not of gold but of tin and aluminum.
At the close of the twentieth century, as one thinks of Russian culture at
the millennial crossroad, it is useful to bear in mind not only proximate
but also distant perspectives; not only the imminent necessity of turning
the binary model into the ternary, but the frightening possibility of the
ternary becoming the medial, a flat unitarian center which would soon no
longer be supported even by the binary nature of the traditional Russian
model. In order to assimilate the ternary model Russian culture needs to
enrich itself with neutral zones and not reject the productive aspects of
the binary model itself. Its experiences with the dual model and explosive
processes may prove to be Russian culture's valuable contribution to the
modern, excessively flattened and medial, "post-historical" state of
Western culture. Perhaps that is the essential meaning of global
processes, that static in one region is balanced by the dynamics of
another; at this point, when history has democratically been pronounced
"finished" in the West, Russian history has resumed turbulently after the
prolonged experience of Communist "post-historicism." Russian culture is
woven from myriad plots, narratives, and anecdotes, both in the semiotic
sense and in the sense of history and everyday life. Western culture on
the brink of the third millennium and gravitating toward a telephonebook-like structure might well find quite a few explosive colllisions for
itself there.
I am not speaking of social upheaval -- in this area the neutral zone of
political and legal institutions worked out in the West would serve as a
safeguard -- but rather of semiotic upheaval, that explosive model with all
of its demonic, apophatic, grotesque, and tragicomic components, which
Russian culture now struggles to overcome but perhaps will not be able to,
will not want to overcome completely. The foundation of the new
secularization should perhaps include a model of directed and
controllable explosion. Not the kind that blows off the "dynamiter"s arm,

as it so often happened in Russian culture -- from Lermontov to Gogol to
Mayakovsky to Tsvetaeva -- but one that uses the energy of highly
charged poles to create dynamic, imbalanced, paradoxical situations in
culture, to create characters and narratives which zigzag sharply across
the boundaries of meaning.
I suspect that the originality of Russian culture will lie in the colorful
interplay of extremes radiating out from its ever-widening neutral and
"natural" zone in both directions for some time yet. Russia will give birth
not only to "Newtonian minds" and level-headed physicists, but also to its
very own "Platos" — metaphysicians of the most radical sort, such as
Soloviev, Fiodorov, Berdiaev, Bogdanov, Tsyolkovsky, Rerikh, or Andreev,
who feel the need to raise the dead, to attribute soul to nature, to make
man immortal, to unite the worm with God, to build the ideal state, to
create heaven and earth anew, to establish paradise on earth, to make
the sun fall from the sky and burn in man's breast. And a necessary
counterweight to metaphysical radicalsim will be conceptual game-playing
with all of these lofty ideas, exposing their many frivolities. Whenever the
ecstasy of "the final battle," "white Communism," "the Eurasian mystery,"
"the great tradition," right- and left-wing "internationales," "Aryan
Platonism," and "Orthodox-Islamic fundamentalism" crops up, there will
also be no lack of apophatic mimicry and nominalistic deflating of these
grandiose 'realities.' Whenever followers of Fiodorov and Rerikh, the
Dugins and Kurgians congregate, one will also find the Prigovs, Sorokins,
Kibirovs, Komars, and Melamides. Wherever one finds Ilia Glazunov with
his iconic, 'monumental' panoramas, one will also encounter Ilia Kabakov
with his trashy 'communal' installations and creative therapy for patients
in the insane asylum. Wherever Peter Verkhovensky is, with his
inflammatory agitation, the burning and cries of the Russian soil, so will
Captain Lebiadkin with his cockroach ditties. The spirit personified by
these two will, I suspect, live on in Russia even after centuries of normal
and natural development along the path of mankind. Even the most social
Chekhov has his Vershynins and Solionys, his Tuzenbach and Chebutkin,
his own projection and his own oberiut, his own "diamond-studded sky"
and his own "hullabaloo."
These extremes cannot be eliminated. One can partially mediate them,
direct the country's socio-economic life toward the channel of natural law
and pragmatism, but the volatile mix of the most radical metaphysics and
the most unpardonable conceptualism cannot be eradicated from the
culture. It is precisely this mix of Verkhovensky's spirit with Lebiadkin's
that lends a peculiar charm to Russian culture, neither quite Eastern nor
Western. Let political leaders in the middle zone worry about the balance

of power or social conventions which are far from the ideal of brotherly
love but which also prevent that excessive intimacy which leads to hatred.
If the millions don't exactly embrace one another, neither do they elbow
others out of their way, and at a political distance they even greet each
other with a polite, almost indifferent smile. But along the periphery
culture should still reel and flabbergast us, creating its ideal states and
utopias -- Thomas More's islands, not Stalinist archipelagos; the finest
conceptual garbage should flood museum halls -- not the Volga and Lake
Baikal.
For now one can only guess at how Russia 's attempt to combine a new
style of political mediation with its traditional cultural polarity. Having
failed to totalize its dual model (sacred matter, heaven on earth, the
church-state, etc.), Russia now starts down the path of polar
neutralization: the middle class, bourgeois culture, the mediation of mass
and elite cultures, the second secularization. . . . But in Russia the secular
and the religious most likely will not retain such balance and neutrality as
is characteristic of America , where religious fundamentalism, with its
anti-secular escapades, is a rare and exceptional thing, not to mention the
even rarer atheistic or anti-clerical bouts of liberalism. In Russia one can
expect very tense relations between the religious and the secular, not so
much on the plane of confrontation -- that is in the past, though excesses
cannot be excluded -- as on the plane of their interaction and attempts at
synthesis, union based upon this or that, more secular or more religious
foundation. The Merezhkovsky-Berdiaev model still has prophetic force,
and as soon as it is found that the overcoming of Russian dualism has
taken a bourgeois, intermediary turn, the temptation will arise to follow
the unifying path, with new specters of religious community and the
merging of heaven and earth looming on the eschatological horizon. A
direct perspective of secular and religious merging will be defined -junction rather than crossroad. This means that we can expect more
religious art from Russia , both inside the temples and outside their
boundaries.
The Russian crossroad is more complicated than the division of one road
into two. It is rather the division of two into three, the change from a
binary system to a ternary -- with an irrational repeating decimal of sixes
signifying a sort of apocalyptic remainder of a path rationally chosen.
The trick is to resist the temptation of "either/or" and from the point of
"crossroad," the separation of two roads, to begin to clear a third—a road
of natural law, an Aristotelean road, a Chekhovian road… But it is even
more difficult to resist the temptation of "both… and, diverting the outer

roads toward the middle, flattening them with smooth asphalt into a
uniform, seamless middle way. Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy should not be
fitted into a single elegant Chekhovian picture-frame. Is it even possible
to squeeze into compact common sense that vast religious experience
which shook Russia 's nerves and its government to the core and
simultaneously produced Gogol, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Soloviev, Rozanov,
Berdiaev, Blok, Mayakovsky, Platonov. . .? In walking the middle path it is
important to retain a sense of the edges, to t ake along a sense of the
"crossroad" even if it has passed long ago. Maybe Russia will be delivered,
as always, by its "troika"—not of fiery stallions kicking up dust in their
wake, but a "troika" of the roads themselves.
We now approach the true meaning of that crossroad at which Russian
culture now stands (and essentially, has always stood). The crossroad is
not the sudden possibility of choice — that is hardly the most stable or
characteristic quality of Russian culture. Blok wrote about such a point of
two crossed paths in his oddly titled article "Timelessness," written during
the peak of acceleration in Russian time, in 1905. "Then it seems that the
end is near, and literature can no longer exist. …Perhaps there is not a
single literature that has survived so many revelations and so much
helplessness at this shaky point, as has Russia 's."98 Russian culture itself
might be defined as a culture of crossed roads. Following the above
discussion one might conclude that Russian culture will never be able to
pass its crossroads, that instead the crossroad will always be drawing
closer, representing the necessity and impossibility of choice.
Yet at the same time the crossroad itself keeps changing along the way
and now it takes the form of an unusual choice: between the crossroad
itself and the single straight path of social culture. Russia has never had
such a clear chance to take the middle way, one which splits the entire
dilemma in two and makes it obsolete. And yet I suspect that Russian
culture will add the middle path to its dual model not to replace divergent
extremes but as a different, third extreme. According to Berdiaev,
Russians can be extreme even in their ordinariness. Or, as the writer
Dmitri Galkovsky recently defined the creative "we," "we are neither
worthless nor saintly, but mediocre. We are mediocrities, but exceptional
ones, expressing baseness and saintliness at their maximal levels. . . ."99
One of the most recent milestones on this extreme-middle road is
Galkovsky's interminable novel/self-commentary entitled Endless Dead
End. Galkovsky's thought turns out to be an extreme middle between
radical metaphysics and the conceptual shaking and draining thereof. The
author calls his method "the reining in of a mentally ungraspable idea in

the philological sphere at the expense of reconciling it with one's own
realism and even cynicism."100Galkovksy tries to combine aspects of both
Berdiaev and Lebiadkin in his fictional counterpart Vladimir Odinokov and
in his real-life behavior as a news-rag metaphysician and refined boor and
buffoon. Galkovsky's two essential themes are "I will destroy you all" and
"Nobody needs me," an oxymoron reflected even in his protagonist's
name: Vladimir Odinokov (literally "world-ruler" "always alone").
Galkovsky combines metaphysical wistfulness and pathos with "mad
raving will," cynically inverting his own metaphysics with vulgar,
streamlined, practical decisions which are immediately parodied and
undergo a fine-toothed aesthetic sorting, which is followed by the
opposite: escape behind the looking glass, disappearance. "I am a
thinking parody . . . a parody which becomes aware of itself as such
disappears. /. . ./ The chain of parodies continues into infinity, becomes
more and more complex and grandiose. It reaches the Absolute, that is, it
parodies eternity."101 The novel is constructed as a never-ending split
between pathways of thought, crossroads multiplying, becoming selfreferential dead ends. Essentially it is a microcosm, Russian culture
modeled as an endless series of inversions and ruptures. Every decision is
taken to a metaphysical extreme and therefore contains the mechanism of
its own derangement. "A Russian will be hanging himself, will already
have jumped from the stool, and then, at the last moment, grabs the
vase."102
Galkovsky's "endless dead end" seems to suspend the drawn-out moment
of Russia's crossroad in time -- this crossroad which appears to be a dead
end with no way out precisely because it wants to remain a crossroad,
continue as a crossroad. Grabbing a rope with one hand and a vase with
the other. Life or death -- and in between, "culture." But if the crossroad
continues like this, it will move onto a new, meta-cultural level, where it
will be defined as the choice between a crossroad and a fixed, straight
path, the middle way. This will mark Russian culture's passage from the
dual model to the ternary, because the third way will not be a detour but
will rather produce a further deepening of the crossroad's essence, as well
as a renewed awareness that it never ends.
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